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EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY AND THE
NEED FOR CAUTIONARY JURY
INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES
fIInnocent people will be imprisoned, and many of the guilty will remain
free.I
In recent decades psychologists have demonstrated that eyewitness
identification testimony is an inherently unreliable type of evidence.'
Its unreliability is due to normal deficiencies in the human memory
process.3 Because eyewitness identification testimony is often the sole
or major evidence of guilt in criminal cases,' the danger of misidentifi-
cation inherent in such testimony poses a serious threat to the Ameri-
can ideal that no innocent person shall be convicted.' When an
1. Jonakait, Reliable Identfication. Could the Supreme Court Tell in Manson v. Brathwaite,
52 U. COLO. L. REv. 511, 528 (1981). This is the dual result that occurs when an innocent defend-
ant is convicted on the basis of a mistaken eyewitness identification. See infra note 6 and accom-
panying text.
2. See infra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
5. See United States v. Greer, 538 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In Greer, Chief Judge Bazelon
stated:
It is a cardinal principal of Anglo-American jurisprudence that, in Blackstone's immor-
tal words, better ten guilty persons should go free than one innocent person be convicted.
Implicit in this principle is a recognition that in any system some innocent persons un-
avoidably will be convicted. But no one wants to see an innocent person suffer, and all
are anguished when confronted with an unjust verdict of guilty.
Id. at 441 (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 358). See also In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("a fundamental value determination of our society [is]
that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free"); United States v.
Hodges, 515 F.2d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 1975) (a "goal" of the courts is to guard against the "injustice"
of convicting an innocent man); McGowan, Constitutional Interpretation and Criminal ldentqfca-
tion, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 235, 238 (1970) (an American "ideal [is] that no innocent man shall
be punished").
Several manifestations of this ideal exist in the American system of criminal justice. One such
manifestation is the burden of proof placed on the Government. See United States v. Barber, 442
F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1972). In Barber, the court stated:
Balancing the liberal admissibility of identification evidence is the commensurately
heavy burden placed upon the prosecution of proving the identity of the criminal actor
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Where identity is placed in issue, the trial court is
required to charge the jury on this high degree of proof.
Id at 527 n.16 (citations omitted). See also n re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). In Winshiv,
the Supreme Court held that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof [of guilt] beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged." Id
Other manifestations include the presumption of innocence and the adversary system itself. In
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innocent individual is mistakenly convicted two injustices occur-the
individual is wrongfully deprived of his freedom, or even life, and soci-
ety's interests remain unprotected as the true criminal remains free.
6
Psychologists and legal commentators advocate various reforms to
preserve this American ideal and to prevent these evils, but none has
received widespread acceptance by the courts.' One suggested reform
requires that juries sitting in criminal cases in which eyewitness identi-
fication testimony plays an important role be given special cautionary
instructions regarding the danger of misidentification and the factors
that they should consider in assessing the reliability of eyewitness testi-
mony.' This reform is the focus of this Note.
Commentators have given little attention to the possibility of provid-
ing special cautionary jury instructions to protect a defendant from the
risks of misidentification and wrongful conviction.9 During the past
United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the court stated that the presumption of
innocence and the adversary system in the Anglo-American system of criminal justice are "safe-
guards which dilute the danger of conviction of the innocent, a problem that concerns every civi-
lized system ofjustice." Id at 554. See also Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 (1978); Estelle
v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
6. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall
stated:
[I1f the police and public erroneously conclude, on the basis of an unnecessarily sugges-
tive confrontation, that the right man has been caught and convicted, the real out-law
must still remain at large. Law enforcement has failed in its primary function and has
left society unprotected from the depradations of an active criminal.
Id at 127. See also Brigham, The 4ccuracy ofEyewitness Evidence: How Do Attorneys See I, 55
FLA. BJ. 714,714 (1981); Jonakaitsupra note 1, at 511 n.2; Woocher, Did Your Eyes Deceive You?
Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identificaion, 29 STAN. L. REV.
969, 969 n.2 (1977).
7. Generally the only reforms available, other than special cautionary jury instructions, are
complete exclusion of eyewitness identification testimony, abolition of the one-witness rule, and
introduction of expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identifications. See infra notes 61-66
and accompanying text.
8. For an example of the kind of cautionary instructions under consideration herein, see
infra note 94.
9. See Woocher, supra note 6, at 1005 n.170 ("To date, few published studies have ad-
dressed the efficacy ofjury instructions."). Most commentators who have addressed the issue have
done so briefly and in the context of advocating the admission of expert psychological testimony
on eyewitness identifications. See, e.g., E. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979); Cunningham
& Tyrrell, Eyewitness Credibility: Adjusting the Sights of the Judiciary, 37 ALA. LAW. 563 (1976);
Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony: Psychological Research and Legal Thought, in M. TONRY & N.
MORRIS, CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Eyewitness Testimony]; Loftus, The Eyewitness on Trial, 16 TRIAL 30 (Oct. 1980); Starkman, The
Use of Eyewitness Identification Evidence in Criminal Trials, 21 CRIM. L.Q. 361 (1978-79);
Woocher, supra note 6.
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decade, however, several courts have opted for this reform." A few
jurisdictions have even held that it is reversible error for a trial court to
refuse to give special cautionary instructions on eyewitness identifica-
tions to the jury." Although one commentator characterized this de-
velopment as a "growing national trend,"' 2 this characterization is
questionable considering that a majority of jurisdictions still refuse to
mandate or even allow' 3 such instructions. 14
10. See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 591 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Hodges,
515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1972); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981); Common-
wealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 399 N.E.2d 482 (1980); State v. Payne, 280 S.E.2d 72 (W. Va.
1981).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 591 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Hodges,
515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1974); Brooks v. State,
380 So. 2d 1012 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980); People v. Guzman, 47 Cal. App. 3d 380, 121 Cal. Rptr. 69
(1975); Freeman v. State, 371 So. 2d 114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), vacated, 380 So. 2d 1288 (Fla.
1980); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981); Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass.
472, 399 N.E.2d 482 (1980); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 378 Mass. 296, 391 N.E.2d 889 (1979);
State v. Payne, 280 S.E.2d 72 (W. Va. 1981).
12. Burke, Eyeitness Testimony)- How Reliable? (Instructions to Jurors Get Tougher), NAT'L
LJ., Nov. 30, 1981, at 12, col. 1.
13. There is a significant distinction between the terms "mandate" and "allow" in this con-
text. "Mandate" refers to cases in which an appellate court holds a trial court's failure or refusal
to give special cautionary instructions on eyewitnesses to be reversible error. Most appellate
courts, however, hold that use of such instructions is within the discretion of the trial court. See,
e.g., United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Montelbano, 605 F.2d
56 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Scott, 578 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978);
United States v. Kavanagh, 572 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Sambrano, 505 F.2d 284
(9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Evans,
484 F.2d 1178 (2d Cir. 1973); Smith v. United States, 343 A.2d 40 (D.C. 1975); People v. Hurley,
95 Cal. App. 3d 899, 157 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1979); People v. Reynolds, 38 Colo. App. 260, 559 P.2d
714 (1976); State v. Thomas, 541 S.W.2d 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Sparks v. State, 96 Nev. 26, 604
P.2d 802 (1980); State v. Williamson, 84 Wis. 2d 370, 267 N.W.2d 337 (1978), rev'd on other
grounds sub nora. Manson v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 413, 304 N.W.2d 729 (1981).
"Allow," on the other hand, refers to situations in which an appellate court holds that it is not
only proper for a trial judge to fail or refuse to give special cautionary instructions on eyewit-
nesses, but that use of such instructions would be improper. Most appellate courts that refuse to
allow the giving of cautionary instructions hold that they constitute improper comment on evi-
dence. See, e.g., State v. Valencia, 118 Ariz. 136, 575 P.2d 335 (Ct. App. 1977); Conley v. State,
270 Ark. 886, 607 S.W.2d 328 (1980); State v. Classen, 31 Or. App. 683, 571 P.2d 527 (1977), rev'd
on other grounds, 285 Or. 221, 590 P.2d 1198 (1979); State v. Robinson, 274 S.C. 198, 262 S.E.2d
729 (1980). For a discussion of prohibition of judicial comment on evidence, see infra notes 248-
69 and accompanying text.
14. The conflict among the jurisdictions is particularly troublesome considering that the in-
herent unreliability of eyewitness identification testimony is an inevitable result of human na-
ture-no one is immune from the normal limitations of his mnemonic capacities. See infra notes
24-36 and accompanying text. Hence, while eyewitness identification testimony is not more inher-
Washington University Open Scholarship
1390 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
This Note divides into three parts the examination of special caution-
ary jury instructions as a safeguard against conviction of innocent indi-
viduals. Part I will briefly survey the deficiencies of eyewitness
identification testimony and the steps taken by the United States
Supreme Court to minimize these deficiencies. In addition, Part I will
consider alternative reforms. Part II will identify the various positions
on giving special cautionary instructions, and the rationales behind
these positions, through an examination of both state and federal
caselaw. Finally, Part III will evaluate these rationales and determine
whether courts should mandate the giving of special cautionary jury
instructions in situations involving eyewitness identification testimony.
Specifically, this Note will consider (1) whether there is a need for spe-
cial cautionary instructions on eyewitness identification testimony;
(2) whether giving special cautionary jury instructions is the optimal
approach in comparison with other possibilities; (3) whether such in-
structions can effectively protect a defendant from the risks of misiden-
tification and wrongful conviction; and (4) whether prohibitions against
comment on evidence are an insurmountable obstacle to this alterna-
tive. The Note concludes that this precautionary measure should be-
come a national trend.
I. BACKGROUND
Eyewitness identification testimony plays a crucial role in the deter-
mination of identity"5 and the concomitant determination of guilt.16 In
most violent crimes, such as assault, rape, and robbery, victims or by-
standers usually have an opportunity to see the individual committing
the crime. 7 Without eyewitnesses' testimony about their out-of-court
ently unreliable in one jurisdiction than in another, criminal defendants receive less protection
against the risks of misidentification in some jurisdictions, see supra note 13 and accompanying
text, than in others, see supra notes 10 & 11 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has yet
to resolve this conflict.
15. "Identity" was defined by Professor Wigmore as: "the quality of sameness with another
person or thing. The essential assumption is that two persons or things are first thought of as
existing, and then, because of common features, the one is alleged, to be the same as the other." 2
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 411, at 478 (Chadbourn rev. 1979) (emphasis in original).
16. See Brigham, supra note 6, at 714. See also Quinn, In the Wake of Wade. The Dimen.
sions of Eyewitness Identpfcation Cases, 42 U. COLO. L. REv. 135, 135 (1970) (author argues that
eyewitness identification testimony is the major cause of wrongful convictions).
17. See N. SOBEL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS 4-5
(Supp. 1972 & 1976) (many cases of rape and robbery go to jury on the uncorroborated testimony
of one eyewitness, and such cases make up 5% of all crimes). See also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.
[Vol. 60:1387
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or in-court identifications of the defendant, the prosecution would
often fail to meet its burden of proof. Moreover, psychologists demon-
strate that eyewitness identification testimony is particularly persuasive
in the minds of most lay jurors, even when contradicted by evidence of
innocence.18
The importance of eyewitness identification testimony is at its apogee
when a case proceeds to the jury under the "one-witness" rule. 19 This
188, 200 (1972) ("In the nature of the crime, there are rarely witnesses to a rape other than the
victim").
18. A leading authority in the field of eyewitness identifications is Dr. Elizabeth F. Loftus. In
a recent study, Dr. Loftus gave a group of subjects a description of a crime and found that only
18% of the subjects would convict on the basis of circumstantial evidence; 72% of them would
convict on the basis of the same evidence when an eyewitness identification is added. Loftus,
Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible Eyewitness, 8 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 116 (Dec. 1974).
Other studies by psychologists, demonstrating that eyewitness identification testimony has a tre-
mendous impact on jurors, were recently surveyed by Dr. Loftus and include the following: Lind-
say, Wells, & Rumpel, Can People Detect Eyewitness-Identqfcation Accuracy Within and .4cross
Situations?, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 79 (1981); Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, Accuracy, Confi-
dence. and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 440 (1979);
Erewitness Testimony, supra note 9, at 128-32. See E. LoiTus, supra note 9. Summarizing the
psychological research in this area, Dr. Loftus stated: "All the evidence points rather strikingly to
the conclusion that there is almost nothing more convincing than a live human being who takes
the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says 'that's the one!'" Id at 19. In addition, Dr.
Loftus observed that "[lurors have been known to accept eyewitness testimony pointing to guilt
even when it isfar outweighed by evidence of innocence." Id at 9 (emphasis in original). See
also P. WALL, EYEwITNESs IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 19-23 (1965):
[J]uries are unduly receptive to identification evidence and are not sufficiently aware of
its dangers. It has been said that "positive recognition by well intended uninterested
persons is commonly accepted unless the alibi is convincing," and that evidence of iden-
tification however untrustworthy, is "taken by the average juryman as absolute proof."
Id at 19 (footnotes omitted).
For judicial recognition of the impact of eyewitness identification testimony, see, for "example,
Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352-53 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("It]he powerful impact
that much eyewitness identification evidence has on juries, regardless of its reliability. . ."); Man-
son v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 120 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("juries unfortunately are
often unduly receptive to [eyewitness identification testimony]"); United States v. Greene, 591
F.2d 471, 475 (8th Cir. 1979) ("the in-court testimony of an eyewitness can be devastatingly per-
suasive").
See generally Brigham, supra note 6, at 714; Cunningham & Tyrrell, supra note 9, at 568; Lof-
tus, The Eyewitness on Trial, 16 TRIAL 30, 31 (Oct. 1980); Pulaski, Neil v. Biggers: The Supreme
Court Dismantles the Wade Trilogy's Due Process Protection, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1097, 1097 (1974);
Woocher, supra note 6, at 970.
19. See People v. Lawrence, 111 Misc. 2d 1027, 1031, 447 N.Y.S.2d 793, 796 (App. Term
1981):
A more serious threat to the rights of the people. . . occurs in cases of "pure" identifica-
tion, i.e., when no corrobative evidence is presented to support the testimony of a single
eyewitness who forcefully states that the accused person committed a criminal act upon
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rule, adhered to by a majority of jurisdictions in the United States, 20
sustains a conviction upon the uncorroborated identification testimony
of a single eyewitness.2 ' Implicit in the one-witness rule is the tradi-
tional view of both the judiciary and the general public that eyewitness
identification testimony is reliable as evidence 2 -- reliable enough to
form the sole foundation for a conviction.23
her person .... In such ... situations, justice requires that the Judge caution the jury
concerning the physical and psychological limitations of the human perceptions.
See also Cunningham & Tyrrell, supra note 9, at 564 n.3 ("The consequences of erroneous identi-
fication are most acute in those cases where no other corroborating evidence exists and the convic-
tion must stand solely on the testimony and identification by the eyewitness, who is often also the
victim."); Thoresby, A Turnaround in the Use of Identifcation Evidence, 62 A.B.A.J. 1343, 1343
(1976) ("in cases that depend wholly or mainly on eyewitness evidence of identification there is a
special risk of wrongful conviction").
For an extensive discussion of the history of the one-witness rule in Anglo-American jurispru-
dence, see 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 15, §§ 2030-2034. The antithesis of the one-witness rule is a
rule requiring the introduction of the testimony of more than one witness or corroboration evi-
dence before allowing a case to go to the jury. Such a requirement is common in sex crimes. See
United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
20. See United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1974). In Holley, the court stated:
It is now well settled beyond argument that the identification of a criminal actor by one
person is itself evidence sufficient to go to the jury and support a guilty verdict and that
application of this rule is not so fundamentally unfair as to be per se a denial of due
process.
Id at 274 (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972)). See Stanley v. Cox, 486 F.2d 48 (4th Cir.
1973), cert. denied sub nom. Stanley v. Slayton, 416 U.S. 958 (1974); United States v. Levi, 405
F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1968). See also United States v. Butler, 636 F.2d 727, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1019 (1981); United States v. Smith, 563 F.2d 1361, 1363 (9th Cir. 1977), cert,
denied, 434 U.S. 1021 (1978); United States v. Sanders, 547 F.2d 1037, 1040 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 956 (1977); United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 783 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied
sub. nom. Cooper v. United States, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977); United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552,
554 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Berryman v. United States, 378 A.2d 1317, 1321 (D.C. 1977); Smith v.
United States, 315 A.2d 163, 167 (D.C.), cert. deniedsub non. Jeffries v. United States, 419 U.S.
896 (1974); Goodyear v. State, 12 Del. 174, 177, 348 A.2d 174, 177 (1975); People v. Tice, 45 11.
App. 3d 639, 642, 359 N.E.2d 1228, 1230 (1976); People v. Burnett, 74 II1. App. 3d 990, 999, 394
N.E.2d 456, 463 (1979); State v. Thomas, 541 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); State v. John-
son, 12 Wash. App. 40, 45, 527 P.2d 1324, 1328 (1975).
21. See generally 7 J. WIGMORe, supra note 15, § 2034, at 343.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 563 F.2d 1361, 1365 (9th Cir. 1977) (Hufstedler, J.,
concurring) ("the premise of the rule is that such eyewitness identifications are generally relia-
ble"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1021 (1978). In addition to this premise, the one-witness rule is justi-
fied on the ground of public policy. See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 554 (D.C. Cir.
1972). In Telfaire, the court stated: "The one-witness rule recognizes that certain crimes are soli-
tary, and as to such crimes both the deterrence of punishment and the rehabilitation of offenders
are proper concerns of the state." Id
23. The continued validity of this rationale is doubtful in light of the psychological evidence,
see infra notes 24-36 and accompanying text, suggesting that eyewitness identifications are inher-
ently unreliable. In United States v. Smith, 563 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
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Since the turn of the century, 24 however, psychologists and research-
ers have mounted convincing proof that eyewitness identifications are
not as trustworthy as the courts and the average juror assume.25 Eye-
witness identifications are a product of the human memory. Experi-
mental psychologists have discovered that the memory process can be
broken down into three stages: perception, storage, and retrieval.26
1021 (1978), the sole evidence against the defendant was the uncorroborated identification testi-
mony of one eyewitness. While concurring in the affirmance of the conviction under the one-
witness rule, Circuit Judge Hufstedler qualified her position by "suggesting the need for reconsid-
eration of the one-witness principle" because the premise of the rule, see supra note 22, "is...
highly dubious, given the extensive empirical evidence that eyewitness identifications are not reli-
able." 563 F.2d at 1365 (Hufstedler, J., concurring). See also United States v. Butler, 636 F.2d
727 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019 (1981), in which Chief Judge Bazelon dissented
from the court's affirmance of a conviction under the one-witness rule. Chief Judge Bazelon pro-
posed adoption of a requirement for corroboration, "where corroborating evidence can be ac-
quired with reasonable effort." Id at 735 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). He argued that to do
otherwise "may so inexcusably flirt with the danger of mistaken identification as to be a violation
of due process." Id (Bazelon, CJ., dissenting). Cf. McGowan, supra note 5, at 238 ("one-eyewit-
ness" identifications represent "conceivably the greatest single threat to the achievement of our
ideal that no innocent man shall be punished").
Courts are not likely to abolish the one-witness rule, however, due to its public policy rationale,
see supra note 22. See also infra notes 193-98 and accompanying text. See generally Starkman,
supra note 9, at 361, 372-74 (position in Canada); Williams, Evidence of Identfcation: The Devlin
Report, 1976 CRIM. L. REv. 407, 410-13 (position in Great Britain); Woocher, supra note 6, at
1001-02 (position in United States).
24. One of the earliest experimental psychologists to apply psychology to the courtroom was
Hugo Munsterberg. Munsterberg utilized "simulated 'crimes'" to demonstrate the high rate of
fallibility that "can occur when people perceive and attempt to recall" what they saw. See H.
MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND (1908), discussed in Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 9,
at 105-07. For a comprehensive compilation of other early studies in "legal psychology," see
Woocher, supra note 6, at 974 n.12.
25. See State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 392, 635 P.2d 1236, 1241 (1981) ("many judges have
assumed that an 'eyeball' witness, who identifies the accused as the criminal, is the most reliable of
witnesses"); Woocher, supra note 6, at 970 ("most juries, and even some judges, are unaware of
the sources of error in eyewitness testimony and consequently place undue faith in its veracity").
For examples of recent major works in this field, see B. CLIFFORD & R. BULL, THE PSYCHOL-
OGY OF PERSON IDENTIFICATION (1948); E. Lorus, supra note 9; N. SOBEL, supra note 17; P.
WALL, supra note 18; A. YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979). See
also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 n.6 (1967) (provides bibliography of psychological
sources).
26. See Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 9, at 110-24; Woocher, supra note 6, at 974-89. Dr.
Loftus explains:
When we experience an important event, a complex process occurs. Nearly all the theo-
retical analyses of the process divide it into three stages. First, there is the acquisition
stage--the perception of the original event-in which information enters a person's
memory system. Second, there is the retention stage, the period between the event and
the eventual recollection of a particular piece of information. Third, there is the retrieval
stage, during which a person recalls stored information. Numerous factors in each of
these stages can effect the accuracy and completeness of an eyewitness account.
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Their studies and experiments lead to the conclusion that the accuracy
of an eyewitness' identification of another human being is often im-
paired by several factors at each stage of the memory process. For
instance, at the perception stage,28 memory is affected by the conditions
surrounding the observation29 as well as the stressful or traumatic na-
ture of the encounter,30 at storage,31 by the amount of time lapsed since
Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 9, at 110 (emphasis in original) (references omitted). See also
Cunningham & Tyrrell, supra note 9, at 575-82. Cunningham and Tyrrell explain that articulation
is a fourth element of the memory process and that "even if the witness perceived the entire event
accurately and was ... able to remember the perceived facts in full, he may not be capable of
recounting the details thereof or may do so in an inaccurate or misleading manner." Id at 582.
27. See Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 9, at 110, Table 1. The net effect of this conclusion
is that the popular notion of a "photographic memory" is nothing more than a myth. See
Woocher, supra note 6, at 976. Woocher explains that "psychological research emphatically has
demonstrated the invalidity of this conception and has revealed that the 'videotape recorder' anal-
ogy is misleading..." Id See also United States v. Butler, 636 F.2d 727, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(Bazelon, CJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019 (1981); Cunningham & Tyrrell, supra note
9, at 575-78.
28. The factors which affect the reliability of eyewitness identifications at the acquisition or
perception stage can be divided into two classifications: event factors and witness factors. See
Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 9, at 110, table 1. Event factors include factors that inhere in the
event, such as the duration of the event, the frequency of viewing opportunities, the complexity of
the encounter, the violent nature of the event, and the seriousness of the event. Id Witness
factors are those inherent in the individual, such as any stress or fear experienced during the event,
the age of the witness, the sex of the witness, prior training to notice details, the expectations or
attitudes of the witness, and personality characteristics. Id In sum, Dr. Loftus states:
Witnesses are more accurate under the following circumstances:
1. Exposure time is longer rather than shorter.
2. Events are less rather than more violent.
3. Witnesses are not undergoing extreme stress or fright.
4. Witnesses are generally free from biased expectations.
5. Witnesses are young adults rather than children.
6. Witnesses are asked to report on salient aspects of an event rather than peripheral
aspects.
Id at 115-16. See also Cunningham & Tyrrell, supra note 9, at 578-80; Woocher, supra note 6, at
976-82.
29. See Woocher, supra note 6, at 978. Observation conditions that can decrease reliability at
the perception stage include the "duration of the observation period," "poor or rapidly changing
lighting conditions," and "distracting noises or other activity." Id
30. See id at 979-80. Woocher points out that "[ajlthough judges and juries often may be
convinced by the victim's assertion that 'I was so frightened that his face is etched in my memory
forever,' psychological research demonstrates that perceptual abilities actually decrease signifi-
cantly when the observer is in a fearful or anxiety-provoking situation." Id at 979 (emphasis in
original). Anxiety decreases reliability at the perception stage because it produces a variety of
physiological and mental effects that interfere with the witness' mnemonic capacities. Id at 978-
80. See also Loftus, supra note 9, at 32 ("[sjtress or fear disrupts perception and, therefore,
memory").
31. The retention or storage stage factors include, in addition to time lapse, any change in the
appearance of the person observed, intervening photographs, and new information about the
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the encounter;32 and at retrieval,3 3 by the suggestive nature of the iden-
tification procedure. 4 These studies suggest that even under optimal
conditions, eyewitness identifications are highly unreliable35 -so unre-
liable that many modem commentators view eyewitness identification
event. See Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 9, at 110, table 1. See also Cunningham & Tyrrell,
supra note 9, at 580-82; Loftus, supra note 9, at 32-33; Woocher, supra note 6, at 982-85. Woocher
also points out that during the retention stage, "because of a psychological need to reduce uncer-
tainty and eliminate inconsistencies, witnesses have a tendency not only to fill any gaps in memory
by adding extraneous details but also to change mental representations unconsciously so that they
all make sense.'" Id at 983.
32. Psychologists have shown that the capacity to remember decreases as the amount of time
Nince the event increases. See Erernimess Testimon; supra note 9, at 119; Woocher, supra note 6,
at 982. Woocher explains that: "memory begins to decay within minutes of the event, so that
considerable memory loss probably occurs during the many days-and often months-that typi-
cally elapse between the offense and an eyewitness identification of the suspect in a criminal case."
33. In the identification context, the recall or retrieval stage is that moment subsequent to the
event when the witness "remembers" that the person he presently sees is the same person he
observed committing the crime. Recall usually occurs in the setting of a police lineup and in-court
testimony. Psychological research demonstrates that memory is affected at the recall stage by the
method of questioning, the procedures utilized in the identification, the status of the questioner,
and any nonverbal communication. See Erewitness Testimony, supra note 9, at 110, table 1. Dr.
Loftus explains that there is a consensus among psychologists on the following:
1. Witnesses produce the most accurate and complete accounts when they are first
asked to recall in their own words, and then to answer specific questions about an
event.
2. Biasing words in a question. . . can contaminate a witness's recollection.
3. Instructions given to witnesses when they attempt to recollect a prior experience can
influence the quality of the recollection. Lax instructions result in more errors than
do strict instructions ...
4. Returning a witness to a state that is similar to the one in which the witness had the
original experience enhances the recollection.
Id at 123-24. See also Cunningham & Tyrrell, supra note 9, at 580-82; Woocher, supra note 6, at
985-89.
34. Psychologists have shown that suggestive conduct on the part of police-such as telling
the witness to take another look at a particular individual in a lineup or composing a lineup of five
white men and one black man when the witness has described the criminal as being black----can
contaminate an eyewitness' memory and cause him to identify the wrong person. See Eyewitness
Testimon) supra note 9, at 120-21; Loftus, supra note 9, at 33-34; Woocher, supra note 6, at 986-
88. The United States Supreme Court has held that the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments provide a defendant with protection against the use of identification evi-
dence obtained by unduly suggestive procedures. See infra notes 43 & 46 and accompanying text.
35. Dr. Loftus explains that this is true because "[t]o be mistaken about details is not the
result of a bad memory, but of the normal functioning of human memory." Loftus, supra note 9,
at 31. In addition, Cunningham and Tyrrell argue that psychological research proves that the
inherent deficiencies of the human memory process are actually exacerbated by the circumstances
surrounding eyewitness identifications of alleged criminals. See Cunningham & Tyrrell, supra
note 9, at 582-85. They explain:
The reasons for such results center on those factors common to the general observer.
The legal circumstances surrounding eyewitness testimony and identification only serve
to amplify these factors. The lineup, or similar identification practices, with its formal-
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testimony as "inherently suspect."
36
The judiciary gradually has become aware of the case against the
reliability of eyewitness identifications. 37 This awareness is partially
attributable to the numerous publicized accounts of miscarriages ofjus-
tice resulting from misidentifications 31 and the research of experimen-
tal psychologists. 39 The United States Supreme Court has expressed its
concern in decisions dealing with the admissibility of out-of-court and
in-court identifications as well as in cases concerning due process limi-
tations on the suggestiveness of identification procedures.40
In the Wade4 1-Gibert4 2-SoVa/ 43 trilogy of cases, decided in 1967,
ity, its authority figures, and its potential for reinforcing the witness and the police to-
wards "solving the case," encourages identification, mistaken or not.
id at 584.
36. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 350 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally
Cunningham & Tyrell, supra note 9, at 563-66; Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 9, at 105-
09; Woocher, supra note 6, at 969-71; authorities cited .wpra note 25.
37. See infra notes 41-57 and accompanying text. In a recent decision, the Kansas Supreme
Court acknowledged that judicial recognition of the problems with eyewitness testimony has de-
veloped slowly:
In spite of the great volume of articles on the subject of eyewitness testimony by legal
writers and the great deal of scientific research by psychologists in recent years, the
courts in this country have been slow to take the problem seriously and, until recently,
have not taken effective steps to confront it.
State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 392, 635 P.2d 1236, 1241 (1981).
38. See, e.g., E. BLOCK, THE VINDICATORS (1963); E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNO-
CENT (1932); J. FRANK & B. FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957); F. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO
AND VANZETri (1927); E. GARDNER, THE COURT OF LAST RESORT (1952); M. HouTS, FROM
EVIDENCE TO PROOF (1956); G. WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT (3d ed. 1963); O'Connor,
"Thats the Maw" A Sobering Study oaEyewitness Identfications and the Poygraph, 49 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 1 (1974).
39. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 228 n.6 (1967) (recognition of results of psychological research); State v. Warren, 230 Kan.
385, 390-92, 635 P.2d 1236, 1239-41 (1981) (same).
40. See, e.g., Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 (1981); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98
(1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
41. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). Wade was convicted of bank robbery on the
basis of identification evidence. Prior to trial, but subsequent to indictment, Wade had been
positively identified by two witnesses at a lineup. He did not have counsel present at the lineup.
At trial the prosecution presented the in-court identification testimony of the two witnesses, and
Wades counsel elicited testimony on cross-examination as to the pretrial lineup identifications.
The Court held that a pretrial lineup is a critical stage of the criminal process and that the sixth
amendment right to counsel entitled Wade to have his attorney present during the confrontation.
Id at 227-39. Because Wade did not have counsel present at the pretrial lineup, the in-court
identification testimony was inadmissible if based solely upon the unlawful out-of-court identifi-
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the Court recognized the "dangers inherent in eyewitness identifica-
tion"'  and created several safeguards. This trilogy prospectively es-
tablished both a right to counsel in certain pretrial identification
confrontations45 and a due process standard for evaluating the sugges-
tiveness of out-of-court identifications.46  The sanction for failure to
cation. The Court observed, however, that the in-court identification testimony might still be
admissible if the prosecution could prove it had indicia of reliability independent of the illegal
out-of-court identification, and accordingly remanded the case for a hearing on that issue. Id at
242-43. The Court established the following five criteria to determine if an in-court identification
satisfies the "independent origins" test:
the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of any discrep-
ancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant's actual description, any
identification prior to lineup of another person, the identification by picture of the de-
fendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the
lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup identification.
Id at 241. Seegeneraly E. LoFTus, supra note 9, at 180-82; Cunningham & Tyrrell, supra note 9,
at 569-71; Woocher, supra note 6, at 990-91.
42. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). In Gilbert, like Wade, see supra note 41, the
defendant had been subjected to a lineup confrontation without the presence of counsel. Id at
269. As in Wade, the witness in Gilbert made an in-court identification of the defendant Id at
270. Unlike Wade, however, the prosecution in Gilbert introduced the witness' testimony as to the
prior illegal lineup identification. Id at 272-73. The Court held that a hearing on whether the in-
court identification had an independent basis would not be adequate, because the illegal lineup
had been introduced, and therefore the defendant was entitled to a new trial. Id at 273-74. See
generall' E. LoFrus, supra note 9, at 182-83; Cunningham & Tyrrell, supra note 9, at 570-71;
Woocher, supra note 6, at 990-91.
43. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). In Stovall, the defendant was subjected to a
showup (one-on-one identification by a witness). The Supreme Court indicated that due process
could be violated if identification procedures are "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to ir-
reparable mistaken identification." Id at 302. The Court also indicated that a showup is inher-
ently suggestive. Id The Court, however, held there was no error in using a showup procedure in
the present case because the fact that the eyewitness/victim was in the hospital and was in danger
of dying justified its use. Hence, the suggestive procedure was necessary. Id See generally E.
LoFrus, supra note 9, at 183-84; Cunningham & Tyrrell, supra note 9, at 572-74; Woocher, supra
note 6, at 992-93.
44. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235 (1967).
45. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. The Court stated that the assistance of
counsel would be necessary to assure fairness in the identification procedure and to prevent police
coverups of the witness' failure to identify the defendant. 388 U.S. at 235. See E. LoFrus, supra
note 9, at 181. The Supreme Court has subsequently narrowed this protection topost-indictment
lineups or showups. See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. The right-to-counsel protec-
tion afforded by Wade is not very far-reaching, however, because, even if a postindictment lineup
identification can be excluded due to the absence of counsel, the witness may still make an in-
court identification if the latter identification has an "independent origin." See supra note 41.
46. The due process standard of Stovall, see supra note 43, is whether in the "totality of the
circumstances," the identification procedure is "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irrepa-
rable mistaken identification." Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). Suggestive identifica-
tion procedures are not "unnecessarily suggestive," and hence not violative of due process, if there
are exigent circumstances for using the procedure. See supra note 43. In addition, subsequent
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comply with the rules established by these three decisions is the com-
plete exclusion of the tainted identification evidence.47
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, however, have narrowed and
restricted the protections afforded by the Wade trilogy."' A decade
ago, in Kirby v. Illinois,4 9 the Court held that a right to counsel during a
pretrial identification procedure does not exist until the defendant has
been indicted or arraigned. 0 In the same year, in Neil v. Biggers',5' the
Court retreated from the due process analysis announced in Stovall, 2
when it focused on the reliability of the in-court identification rather
than the fairness of procedures followed during the out-of-court identi-
fication to determine the admissibility of the in-court identification. 3
The Biggers Court established five criteria for determining reliability:
opinions of the Court have replaced a due process evaluation of identification procedures with a
reliability standard. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text. See also Simmons v. United
States, 390 US. 377 (1968) (photographic pretrial identifications upheld for investigatory purposes
despite inherent dangers).
47. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1967).
48. See generally E. LoFrus, supra note 9; Cunningham & Tyrrell, supra note 9; Decker,
Moriarty & Albert, The Demise of Procedural Protections in Lay- Witness Iden teailons in Federal
Court: Who is the CulpritZ 9 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 335 (1978); Jonakait, supra note 1; Levine & Tapp,
The Psychology of Criminalldentfication The Gap From Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079
(1973); Pulaski, supra note 18; Salisbury, Eyewitness Identfications: 4 New Perspective On Old
Law, 15 TULSA L.J. 38 (1979); Woocher, supra note 6; Note, Manson v. Brathwaite: Lookingfor
the Silver Lining in the Area of Eyewitness Identfications, 25 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1079 (1978).
49. 406 U.S. 682 (1972). In Kirby, the defendants were identified by the victim shortly after
they were arrested. Id at 684. The defendants did not have an attorney present at the identifica-
tion, but the victim was later allowed to make in-court identifications during their trial. 1d at 684-
86. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that there is no sixth amendment right
to counsel until after "adversary judicial criminal proceedings" have started. Id at 689.
50. Dr. Loftus observes that the result of Kirby is that "the police now often delay formal
charges until after the identification has been made." E. LoFrus, supra note 9, at 185 (footnotes
omitted).
51. 409 U.S. 188 (1972). InBiggers, the defendant, who was convicted of rape, was identified
by the victim in a showup procedure and evidence of the identification was introduced at trial. ld
at 189. Even though there were no exigent circumstances as in Sovall, see supra notes 43 & 46,
the Court affirmed, holding that "under the 'totality of the circumstances' the identification was
reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive." 409 U.S. at 199.
52. See supra notes 43 & 46.
53. The Biggers Court explained this apparent shift in focus by arguing that "filt is the likeli-
hood of misidentification which violates a defendant's right to due process. .. " and this likeli-
hood turns on reliability. 409 U.S. at 198-99. Dr. Loftus explains:
The Court agreed that the confrontation was suggestive, that no circumstance such as the
need for a prompt identification justified it, but still decided that the identification testi-
mony was admissible. It placed almost exclusive emphasis on the reliability of the iden-
tification and retreated from the right to due process afforded by the earlier cases.
E. LoF s, supra note 9, at 185.
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(1) the witness' chance to see the criminal at the time of the crime;
(2) the witness' degree of attention; (3) the degree of similarity between
the witness' prior description of the criminal and the defendant; (4) the
witness' level of confidence in the correctness of the identification
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and (5) the time lapse
between the crime and the confrontation. 4 Most recently, in Manson v.
Brathwaite,55 the Court completed its retreat from a due process evalu-
ation of identification procedures when it stated that "reliability is the
linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony 56
and that the Biggers factors are to be considered in measuring
reliability.57
The general rule that has evolved is that eyewitness identification
evidence will not be excluded unless the identification procedures are
so suggestive and the eyewitness' identification is so unreliable that a
-very substantial likelihood" of misidentification exists. 8  Courts
rarely find such a risk to exist.5 9 Once the evidence is admitted at trial,
54. 409 U.S. at 199-200. The Biggers factors, which are a variation of the Wade "independ-
ent origins" test, see supra note 41, have formed the basis of several special cautionary jury in-
structions. See, e.g., United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1972); State v. Warren,
230 Kan. 385, 398-99, 635 P.2d 1236, 1244-45. See also infra note 155 and accompanying text.
55. 432 U.S. 98 (1976). In Manson, the defendant was convicted of possession and sale of
heroin. At trial, evidence of an identification by an undercover agent/eyewitness from a single
photograph was admitted as the only evidence of defendant's guilt. Id at 107. The defendant
argued that the procedure was suggestive because only one photograph was used and that it was
unnecessary because there were no exigent circumstances. ld The Court, however, affirmed,
reasoning that the identification was reliable as tested by the Biggers factors. Id at 117. See infra
notes 56 & 57 and accompanying text.
56. 432 U.S. at 114.
57. Id See also Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 (1981). In Watkins, the defendant argued
that due process requires the admissibility of pretrial identification evidence be determined in a
hearing out of the jury's presence. Id at 346. The defendant analogized to confession evidence,
the admissibility and voluntariness of which must be determined in a separate hearing. Id The
Watkins Court adhered to the reliability standard for admissibility of identification evidence but
rejected the defendant's assertion. Id at 347. The Court stated that while such a hearing "may
often be advisable," id at 349, it was not constitutionally required because "[w]here identification
evidence is at issue. . . no. . .special considerations justify a departure from the presumption
that juries will follow instructions" to disregard the evidence, should it be found inadmissible. Id
at 347. In addition, the Court argued that a defendant can be adequately protected by the "time-
honored process of cross-examination," id at 349, and closing argument, when the jury hears
identification evidence that is later held inadmissible. But see id at 349-60 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
58. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). In making this determination courts
generally apply the five Biggers factors. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. Eyewit-
ness evidence is admissible by statute in federal courts. See 18 U.S.C. § 3502 (1976).
59. To date the Supreme Court has held out-of-court identification procedures to be violative
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the issue becomes whether the inherent unreliability of eyewitness
identification testimony necessitates any additional safeguards against
misidentification.
The traditional position of the courts is that no additional protections
are necessary.60 Nevertheless, defense attorneys and commentators
have attempted to persuade the courts to accept various safeguards.
These include complete exclusion of eyewitness identification testi-
mony,6 abolition of the one-witness rule,62 admission of expert psy-
chological testimony,63 and special cautionary jury instructions.64
of due process, and hence inadmissible, in only one case, Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
The reluctance of trial courts to exclude eyewitness identification testimony on general grounds of
unreliability is attributable to the fact that in many cases the potential prejudice of such evidence
is outweighed by its probative value. Woocher explains that:
As a practical matter, in many cases eyewitness evidence provides the only means of
linking the defendant to the crime; even an unreliable identification may be completely
accurate and would seem preferable to none at all in these situations. In other cases,
additional evidence of the defendant's guilt may exist that, taken alone, would not dis-
pose of the case but, in conjunction with an eyewitness identification, would lead a jury
to convict.
Woocher, supra note 6, at 1001.
60. In general, courts view the postadmission problem as one of the weight and credibility to
be assigned to the identification testimony. See infra notes 118 & 144 and accompanying text.
This is traditionally a function within the province of the jury, and courts, as a rule, are reluctant
to usurp any of the jury's functions. See Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347 (1981). One
reason for this reluctance is the fear of tipping the scale too heavily in favor of either the defend-
ant or the prosecution. See infra note 207 and accompanying text. Another reason is the view,
shared by a majority ofjurisdictions, that matters of weight and credibility of evidence are better
left to the advocacy of counsel during cross-examination and closing arguments. See infra notes
118 & 143 and accompanying text. Despite their awareness of the intrinsic deficiencies of eyewit-
ness identification testimony, see supra notes 37-57 and accompanying text, members of the judici-
ary are very reluctant to take an active role, beyond determining admissibility, in reducing the risk
of wrongful conviction created by such deficiencies. See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
61. See generally E. LoFrTus, supra note 9, at 187-88; Woocher, supra note 6, at 1000-01.
62. Abolition of the one-witness rule, see supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text, would
mean mandating a rule that a defendant cannot be convicted unless there is more than one eyewit-
ness who identifies the defendant or there is evidence to corroborate an identification by one
eyewitness. See generally M. HouTs, supra note 38, at 26; E. LorTus, supra note 9, at 188-89; P.
WALL, supra note 18, at 182-93; Cunningham & Tyrrell, supra note 9, at 588-89; Woocher, supra
note 6, at 1001-02.
63. Introduction of expert psychological testimony on the inherent deficiencies of eyewitness
identifications and the factors affecting the reliability of such identifications is a reform that com-
mentators in both the legal profession and the field of psychology have given a great deal of
attention and support. See generally E. LoFrus, supra note 9, at 191-203; Cunningham & Tyrrell,
supra note 9, at 586-88; Katz & Reid, Expert Testimony on the Fallibility ofEyewitness Identfca-
lion, 1 CRIM. JUST. J. 177, 197-206 (1977); Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 9, at 134-38; Loftus,
supra note 9, at 34-35; Starkman, supra note 9, at 377-85; Woocher, supra note 6, at 1005-30. For
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Courts are entirely unreceptive to the first two solutions.65 Some courts
tolerate the third solution, but no court mandates it.66 The fourth solu-
an example of this type of testimony, see E. Loirus, supra note 9, at 217-35 (transcript of testi-
mony given in actual case).
64. See generally E. LoFrus, supra note 9, at 189-90; Cunningham & Tyrrell, supra note 9, at
588; Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 9, at 133-34; Starkman, supra note 9, at 375-77; Woocher,
supra note 6, at 1002-05.
65. Both of these solutions are unacceptable due to policy considerations. Woocher, supra
note 6, observes that complete exclusion of eyewitness evidence is objectionable because it "would
prevent conviction of the truly guilty." Id at 1001. He explains:
As a practical matter, in many cases eyewitness evidence provides the only means of
linking the defendant to the crime; even an unreliable identification may be completely
accurate and would seem preferable to none at all in these situations. In other cases,
additional evidence of the defendant's guilt may exist that, taken alone, would not dis-
pose of the case but, in conjunction with an eyewitness identification, would lead a jury
to convict.
Id Hence, eyewitness identification testimony is regularly admitted in criminal trials. See supra
notes 58-60 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of these policy considerations, see
infra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
Abolition of the one-witness rule is unacceptable to courts for similar policy reasons. Woocher
explains that this solution "would allow a guilty defendant to escape conviction despite a highly
reliable, if uncorroborated, identification." Woocher, supra note 6, at 1002. Reversal of a convic-
tion for failure to give special cautionary jury instructions, however, has occurred most frequently
in situations in which the case went to the jury under the one-witness rule. See, e.g., United States
v. Greene, 591 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1974);
State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981); State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 430 A.2d 914
(1981); State v. Payne, 280 S.E.2d 72 (W. Va. 1981). For a further discussion of the policy consid-
erations involved, see infra notes 193-98 and accompanying text. See also supra note 23 (judicial
doubts of the validity of one-witness rule). See generally supra notes 19-23 and accompanying
text.
66. The majority rule in the United States is either that expert psychological testimony on
eyewitness identifications is inadmissible or that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by
refusing to admit it. See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1979);
United States v. Watson, 587 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Davis v. United
States, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1100 (1977); United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'don other grounds
sub nom. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148
(9th Cir. 1973); State v. Valencia, 118 Ariz. App. 136, 575 P.2d 335 (1977); Dyas v. United States,
376 A.2d 827 (D.C. 1977); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981); State v. Galloway,
275 N.W.2d 736 (Iowa 1979); State v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. 1980); Hampton v.
State, 92 Wis. 2d 450, 285 N.W.2d 868 (1979). No case has ever held it reversible error for a trial
court to refuse to admit expert psychological testimony on eyewitnesses. See State v. Helterbridle,
301 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 1980).
The objections to such testimony, as Dr. Loftus explains, are:
that it invades the province of the jury, that it will have undue influence on the jury, that
it is well within the common knowledge of the jury, or that it will lead to a battle of the
experts that will detract from the real issues of the case.
Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 9, at 134. For further discussion of this solution, see infra notes
199-207 and accompanying text.
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tion is the subject of the remainder of this Note.
II. THE CASE LAW
A. Before United States v. Telfaire
Prior to 197267 most courts in the United States refused to recognize
the inherent unreliability of eyewitness identification testimony.68 Al-
though courts frequently scrutinized pretrial identification procedures
to prevent suggestive conduct on the part of law enforcement officials69
and required that eyewitness identifications have some indicia of relia-
bility before admission during trial,7° nearly all jurisdictions refused to
mandate special cautionary instructions to the jury on eyewitness
identifications.7'
In response to the Supreme Court's recognition of the unreliability of
eyewitness identifications in the Wade trilogy,72 however, the United
67. United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972), wasdecided in 1972. Tela/re
was not necessarily the first case to approve of special cautionary instructions on eyewitnesses, see
infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text, but the "Model Instructions" that it articulated have
become the standard type of instructions. See infra notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 40-59 and accompanying text.
70. Id For an argument that the requirements for admissibility of eyewitness identification
testimony are not adequate to "guard against misidentification and the conviction of the inno-
cent," see United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273, 275 (4th Cir. 1974).
71. See United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971). In
Barber, the court stated:
The trial court relied on formidable precedential authority which holds that it is neces-
sary neither to instruct the jury that they should receive certain identification testimony
with caution, nor to suggest to them the inherent unreliability of certain eye-witness
identification. In United States v. Moss, 410 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1969), for example, we
said: "the trial judge was under no obligation to give. . . a special instruction" on the
uncertainty and unreliability of identification testimony. In Cullen v. United States, 408
F.2d 1178 (8 Cir. 1969), the trial court was requested to charge "that testimony tending to
prove identity is to be scrutinized with extreme care," and that "no class of testimony is
more uncertain and less to be relied upon than that of identity;" on appeal the court held
the instructor properly refused because the trial court fairly instructed the jury as to the
government's burden of proof and the facts to be considered by them before rendering a
verdict. See also Barber v. United States, 412 F.2d 775 (5 Cir. 1969); McGee v. United
States, 402 F.2d 434, 436 (10 Cir. 1968).
442 F.2d at 526. See also United States v. Hessler, 469 F.2d 1294 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
989 (1972); United States v. Shelvy, 458 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Cole, 453 F.2d
902 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 922 (1972); United States v. Allen, 449 F.2d 346 (9th Cir.
1971); Kaneshiro v. United States, 445 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Hall, 437 F.2d
248 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 976 (1971); United States v. Perez, 431 F.2d 941 (9th Cir.
1970); United States v. Carter, 422 F.2d 519 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Levi, 405 F.2d 380
(4th Cir. 1968); Jones v. United States, 358 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1966).
72. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
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States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 73 realized the
need for a special instruction relating identity to the reasonable doubt
standard.7 4 In 1969, in Macklin v. United States," the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit prospectively promulgated a rule requiring that such an
instruction be given where identification is a major issue, but held that
in the case before it the general instructions were adequate.76
Shortly thereafter, the Third Circuit, in United States v. Barber,77
73. Interestingly, the District of Columbia Circuit recognized the dangers of eyewitness iden-
tification testimony and the need for special instructions to the jury as early as 1942. See McKen-
zie v. United States, 126 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Shelvy, 458 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Macklin v. United
States, 409 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
Salley v. United States, 353 F.2d 897 (D.C. Cir. 1965). In United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552,
555 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the court stated that "[t]hese opinions sought to take into account the tradi-
tional recognition that identification testimony presents special problems of reliability by stressing
the importance of an identification instruction even in cases meeting the Constitutional threshold
of admissibility."
75. 409 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
76. The Macklin court stated:
We think that now, after the Supreme Court has focused on identification problems in its
1967 Wade-Gilbert-Stovall trilogy, it is even more imperative that trial courts should
include, as a matter of routine, an identification instruction. In cases where identification
is a major issue the judge should not rely on defense counsel to request so important a
charge.
Id at 178. The Macklin rule was held nonretroactive in United States v. Washington, 413 F.2d
409 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
The Macklin court was not concerned with informing the jurors of the dangers of eyewitness
identification testimony or of the appropriate factors to consider in evaluating the reliability of
such testimony, but rather with assuring that the jury was aware that it had to find the identifica-
tion of the defendant as the criminal beyond a reasonable doubt. 409 F.2d at 177-78. The follow-
ing is an example of an instruction relating identity to reasonable doubt:
The evidence in this case raises the question of whether the defendant was in fact the
criminal actor and necessitates your resolving any conflict or uncertainty in testimony on
that issue.
The burden of proof is on the prosecution with reference to every element of the crime
charged and this burden includes the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the
identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime charged.
I E. DEviTr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 11.32 (2d ed.
1970).
77. 442 F.2d 517 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971). In Barber, several defendants
had been convicted of assaulting two FBI agents and helping a prisoner in the agents' custody to
escape. The defendants requested that instructions be given to the jury on the inherent unreliabil-
ity of identification testimony and the caution with which such testimony should be approached.
The trial court refused and in lieu thereof gave a general instruction on the credibility of witnesses
and an instruction relating identification to the reasonable doubt standard, see id at 525. On
appeal the defendants argued that "the entangled circumstances of this case compelled a more
exacting charge to underscore the critical nature of the identification issue-that the commingling
of participants and passersby in the vortex of a sudden mob scene rendered arduous and crucial
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went a step beyond Macklin and approved the use of a model instruc-
tion on identification.7  The model directs the judge to instruct the jury
to treat the identification as a "statement of fact" 79 if the court finds
four conditions of reliability to exist.8° If any one of the conditions are
absent, the judge instructs the jury that the testimony "must be received
with caution and scrutinized with care."'" The Barber court, however,
approved its model instruction for prospective use only and found no
error in the general instructions given by the trial court in that particu-
lar case.82
the task of determining who did what to whom." Id at 525. The Barber court agreed that addi-
tional instructions might have been proper, but held that there was no reversible error in the trial
court's refusal because the trial court's conduct was supported by "formidable precedential au-
thority." Id at 526. See also supra note 71.
78. The Barber court characterized eyewitness identification testimony as "an expression of a
belief or impression by the witness." 442 F.2d at 527. The Barber instruction, however, allows the
jury to treat the testimony as a "statement of fact" if its four indicia of reliability are present, but
only as an "expression of opinion" if any one of the four are absent. The full text of the court's
instruction is as follows:
In any case raising the question whether the defendant was in fact the criminal actor, the
jury will be instructed to resolve any conflict on uncertainty on the issue of identification.
The jury will be instructed that identification may be made through the perception of
any of the witness' senses, and that it is not essential that the witness himself be free from
doubt as to the correctness of his opinion. The identification testimony may be treated
by the jury as a statement of/act by the witness: (I) if the witness had the opportunity to
observe the accused; (2) if the witness is positive in his identification; (3) if the witness'
identification is not weakened by prior failure to identify or by prior inconsistent identifi-
cation; and (4) if, after cross-examination, his testimony remains positive and unquali-
fied. In the absence of any one of these four conditions, however, the jury will be
admonished by the court that the witness' testimony as to identity must be receh'ed with
caution and scrutinized with care. The burden of proof on the prosecution extends to
every element of the crime charged, including the burden of proving beyond a reason-
able doubt the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime for which he
stands charged.
Id at 528 (emphasis added). The court indicated that in adopting this instruction it was following
the decisions of Pennsylvania courts. Id See Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 378 Pa. 412, 106 A.2d
820 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 875 (1954); Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 204 Pa. Super. Ct. 213,
203 A.2d 235 (1964).
79. United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 528 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971).
For the full text of the Barber instruction, see supra note 78.
80. See supra note 78. In regard to condition numbers (2) and (4), psychological research
suggests that there is actually an inverse relationship between the eyewitness' "positiveness" on
direct and cross-examination, and the reliability of the identification testimony. See, e.g., E. LoF-
TUS, supra note 9, at 100-01; Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 9, at 123; Woocher, supra note 6, at
985.
81. United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 528 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971).
For the full text of the Barber instruction, see supra note 78.
82. United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 528 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971). See
supra note 77.
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B. United States v. Telfaire
In 1972 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia decided the pioneer 3 case of United States v. Telfaire.Y4 A jury
convicted Melvin Telfaire of robbing Mr. Peregory of ten dollars in a
poorly lighted portion of a hotel. 5 The only evidence against Telfaire
was Mr. Peregory's eyewitness identification testimony.86 Telfaire's de-
fense was alibi,87 and on appeal he argued that the trial judge commit-
ted reversible error by failing to give a special instruction on
identification sua sponte.88
The District of Columbia Circuit held that this omission was not
prejudicial for two reasons. First, Mr. Peregory's identification pos-
sessed indicia of reliability, because he had an "adequate opportunity
to observe"8 9 and made a "spontaneous identification" 9 of the defend-
ant at the crime scene within an hour after the commission of the
crime. Second, because the jury's attention was "significantly focused
on the issue of identity,"' the trial judge's general instructions on the
prosecution's burden of proof and the defense of alibi were sufficient.9
Telfaire's conviction was therefore upheld.93
83. State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 396, 635 P.2d 1236, 1243 (1981). See also Woocher, supra
note 6, at 1003 ("The leading decision in this area is United States v. Telfaire."). Telfaire, how-
ever, is not the first decision to approve of the use of special cautionary jury instructions on eye-
witnesses. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
84. 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
85. Id at 554 n.4.
86. Id
87. Id
88. Id at 554. Dicta in Macklin v. United States, 409 F.2d 174, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1969), see
supra note 76 and accompanying text, indicated that a defendant is entitled to an identification
instruction even absent a request from defense counsel. Black's Law Dictionary defines "sua
sponte" as being "of his or its own will or motion; voluntarily; without prompting or suggestion."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1277 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). No court has ever reversed a conviction for a
trial court's failure to give a special identification instruction sua sponte. But see infra note 212.
89. 469 F.2d at 556.
90. Id
91. Id
92. The trial court's instructions are reprinted at id n.13.
93. Id at 552. In reaching this conclusion the Telfaire court explained:
We do not qualify in any particular the importance of and need for a special identifica-
tion instruction. But in evaluating the prejudice inherent in the failure of the trial court
to offer one, we have taken into account that in the circumstances of a particular case, the
proof, contentions and general instructions may have so shaped the case as to convince
us that in any real sense the minds of the jury were plainly focused on the need for
finding the identification of the defendant as the offender proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
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In addition to affirming the defendant's conviction, the Te/faire court
articulated a set of Model Special Instructions on Identification.94 Al-
though these special cautionary instructions were not set forth in
Id at 555-56 (footnotes omitted). Thus, it is apparent that the Telfaire court was primarily con-
cerned with assuring that the jury was aware that the reasonable doubt standard applied to the
issue of identity. This is a concern which is distinct from informing the jury of the dangers inher-
ent in eyewitness identifications and the factors that should be considered in evaluating such evi-
dence. See infra note 165 and accompanying text. See also Woocher, .wpra note 6, at 1004.
94. 469 F.2d at 558-59. The text of the instruction is as follows:
One of the most important issues in this case is the identification of the defendant as
the perpetrator of the crime. The Government has the burden of providing identity,
beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not essential that the witness himself be free from doubt
as to the correctness of his statement. However, you, the jury, must be satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification of the defendant before you may
convict him. If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
the person who committed the crime, you must find the defendant not guilty.
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or impression by the witness. Its
value depends on the opportunity the witness had to observe the offender at the time of
the offense and to make a reliable identification later.
In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you should consider the follow-
ing:
(1) Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity and an adequate opportu-
nity to observe the offender?
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe the offenders at the time
of the offense will be affected by such matters as how long or short a time was available,
how far or close the witness was, how good were lighting conditions, whether the witness
had had occasion to see or know the person in the past.
[In general, a witness bases any identification he makes on his perception through the
use of his senses. Usually the witness identifies an offender by the sense of sight-but
this is not necessarily so, and he may use other senses.]
(2) Are you satisfied that the identification made by the witness subsequent to the
offense was the product of his recollection? You may take into account both the strength
of the identification, and the circumstances under which the identification was made.
If the identification by the witness may have been influenced by the circumstances
under which the defendant was presented to him for identification, you should scrutinize
the identification with great care. You may also consider the length of time that lapsed
between the occurrence of the crime and the next opportunity of the witness to see de-
fendant, as a factor bearing on the reliability of the identification.
[You may also take into account that an identification made by picking the defendant
out of a group of similar individuals is generally more reliable than one which results
from the presentation of the defendant alone to the witness.]
[(3) You make [sic] take into account any occasions in which the witness failed to
make an identification of defendant, or make an identification that was inconsistent with
his identification at trial.]
(4) Finally, you must consider the credibility of each identification witness in the
same way as any other witness, consider whether he is truthful, and consider whether he
had the capacity and opportunity to make a reliable observation on the matter covered in
this testimony.
I again emphasize that the burden of proof on the prosecutor extends to every element
of the crime charged, and this specifically includes the burden of proving beyond a rea-
sonable doubt the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime with which he
stands charged. If after examining the testimony, you have a reasonable doubt as to the
accuracy of the identification, you must find the defendant not guilty.
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mandatory terms, the court did indicate that failure to use the model in
the future would create a danger that should not be overlooked except
on a showing of good cause.95 The model instructs that identity is an
issue in the case, that the prosecution has the burden of proving iden-
tity beyond a reasonable doubt, and that certain enumerated factors
should be considered in assessing the identification testimony.96 These
factors, which are similar to those set forth by the Supreme Court in
Neil v. Biggers,97 include the capacity and opportunity of the eyewit-
ness to observe the criminal, the suggestiveness of circumstances ex-
isting during any identification subsequent to the crime, any prior
failure of the eyewitness to identify the defendant, and the general
credibility of the eyewitness' testimony.98
C. Telfaire-Type Instructions in the Federal Circuits
The advocation of Telfaire-type special cautionary jury instructions
has met with varying degrees of success in the United States Courts of
Appeals.99 Although the District of Columbia Circuit initially took the
lead100 in championing such instructions to minimize the dangers of
eyewitness identifications, that circuit has yet to impose a strict require-
ment for giving the instructions. °10 The court has held that the instruc-
Id The three bracketed passages are "to be used only if appropriate" with "[i]nstructions to be
inserted or modified as appropriate to the proof and contentions.' Id at 558 n*.
95. Id at 557.
96. For the text of the instruction, see supra note 94.
97. 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972). See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. As noted by
Woocher, supra note 6, at 1003 n.161, these factors are also similar to the Wade "independent
origins" test. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
98. For the text of the instruction, see supra note 94. See also Woocher, supra note 6, at 1003.
In a concurring opinion to Telfaire, Chief Judge Bazelon argued that the model instruction should
also inform the jury that "members of one race have greater difficulty in accurately identifying
members of a different race." 469 F.2d at 559 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). Most courts have
rejected this modification. See, e.g.. United States v. Ingram, 600 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1979); Ab-
ney v. United States, 347 A.2d 403 (D.C. 1975); State v. Allen, 301 N.C. 489, 272 S.E.2d 116
(1980). But see United States v. Smith, No. 81-3069 (6th Cir., Aug. 17, 1981) (trial court warned
jury concerning the fact that defendant was the only black person in the courtroom). For an
argument opposing Chief Judge Bazelon's modification, see United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d
552, 561-63 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Leventhal, J., concurring).
99. See general Cunningham & Tyrrell, supra note 9, at 588 n.145; Woocher, supra note 6,
at 1003-04 nn. 162-65. For a discussion of the use of cautionary jury instructions on identifications
in other countries, see generally Starkman, supra note 9, at 375-77 (Canada); Thoresby, supra note
19, at 134344 (Great Britain); Williams, supra note 23, at 410-15 (Great Britain).
100. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
101. See, ag., United States v. Thomas, 485 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Telfaire instructions
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tions need be given only in cases applying the one-witness rule. 0 2
Moreover, where the rule does apply, a trial court's failure to give the
Tefaire instructions sua sponte is not error if the identification appears
reliable.1 3 The District of Columbia Circuit has never reversed a con-
viction for failure to give Telfaire-type instructions."°
Several other circuits have approved using cautionary instructions on
eyewitness identifications as a safeguard against misidentification. 05
The First,0 6 Second, 107 Third, 08 Sixth, 0 9 Ninth,110 and Tenth' 1' Cir-
need not be given verbatim). See also supra note 94 (text of Tefaire instruction). Cf. United
States v. Butler, 636 F.2d 727, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (trial judge properly gave "a version of the
'Telfaire instruction' tailored to fit the facts of this case.")
102. United States v. Jackson, 509 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Jackson, a great deal of
corroborating evidence accompanied the victim's identification of the defendant. In affirming the
defendant's conviction for armed robbery the court stated that "[t]he problem of witness-compe-
tence is accentuated in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be rested on an uncor-
roborated identification by a single witness." Id at 507.
103. United States v. Garner, 499 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Garner, the defendant's con-
viction for distribution of heroin was founded solely on the testimony of an undercover agent who
saw and dealt with the defendant on six occasions during a two-week period. The trial court
instructed the jury only that identification was in issue and that it was an essential element of the
government's burden of proof, but the defense neither objected to the court's instructions nor
requested Telfaire-type instructions. On appeal, the court held there was no error because "[tihe
instruction suggested in the Telfaire case does not focus on identifications of this sort, although it
may be appropriate when a witness to a robbery or homicide has identified some stranger to him
as the perpetrator of the crime." Id at 538.
104. But'see United States v. Greer, 538 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In Greer, the court granted
a new trial, at the request of the trial judge, for a defendant convicted of armed robbery and
assault with a dangerous weapon. Eyewitness identification testimony of the victim was the sole
prosecution evidence and the defendant had presented much alibi evidence. The opinion does not
indicate whether Telfaire-type instructions were given to the jury, but the appellate court agreed
with the trial judge that the victim's "identification is suspect and that 'the interest of justice'
demands a new trial," id at 441, even though the victim's testimony "indicated that all the indicia
of reliability to which this court has repeatedly looked were present," id at 443.
105. See, e.g., United States v. Cain, 616 F.2d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Scott, 578 F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Kavanagh, 572 F.2d 9, 12 (Ist Cir.
1978); United States v. Lewis, 565 F.2d 1248, 1253 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 973 (1978);
United States v. Roundtree, 527 F.2d 16, 19 (8th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 923 (1976);
United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650, 652-53 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d
273, 275 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. O'Neal, 496 F.2d 368, 373 (6th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Fernandez, 456 F.2d 638, 643-44 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 528 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971). The Fifth Circuit has not ruled on the issue to date.
106. See, e.g., United States v. Kavanagh, 572 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978). In Karanagh, the trial
court refused to give the Barber instructions. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text. The
government's case consisted of one eyewitness' identification and circumstantial corroborating ev-
idence. The defense elicited prior inconsistent identifications by the government's eyewitness and
two other eyewitnesses who were not called to testify. While approving of the requested instruc-
tion, the court nevertheless held that "the failure to give it is not reversible error." 572 F.2d at 12.
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The court found this result justified in light of the "skillful cross-examination," the general in-
structions to the jury, and because the case against the defendant was not "identification testimony
done." Id. at 12-13. The court also refused to mandate a model instruction. Id at 13.
107. See, e.g., United States v. Montelbano, 605 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Mar-
chand, 564 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); United States v. Gentile,
530 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976); United States v. Evans, 484 F.2d 1178 (2d
Cir. 1973); United States v. Fernandez, 456 F.2d 628 (2d Cir. 1972); Willin v. Ajello, 496 F. Supp.
804 (D. Conn. 1980), aff'd, 652 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1981). In United States v. Montelbano, the court
held that the trial court's refusal to give a "cautionary instruction concerning the reliability of
eyewitness identification testimony," was not reversible error because there was substantial cor-
roboration evidence and the "usual instructions regarding the credibility of witnesses" were ade-
quate. 605 F.2d 56, 56 (2d Cir. 1979). The Second Circuit has not yet mandated a model
instruction on identifications. But see id at 60 (Feinberg, J., concurring).
108. United States v. Wilford, 493 F.2d 730 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 851 (1974); United
States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1972). For a discussion of
Barber, see supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text. In Wiford, the defendant was convicted on
the basis of eyewitness identifications by an informer and an undercover agent. The informer met
the four conditions of the Barber instruction and the jury was permitted to treat his identification
as a statement of fact. The undercover agent, on the other hand, did not meet the four conditions,
but the trial court did not give a cautionary instruction and defense counsel did not request one.
Nevertheless, the court did not find the trial court's failure to give the instruction sua sponte
reversible error. The court argued that the facts of Barber were distinguishable from the present
case in that the undercover agent's identification was not crucial. 493 F.2d at 735. In a strong
dissent, however, Judge Adams argued that the trial court's failure to give a Telfaire-type instruc-
tion sua sponte was "prejudicial to the defendant's ability to secure an adequately informed deter-
mination of his innocence of guilt," id at 736 (Adams, J., dissenting), and therefore required
reversal.
109. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, No. 81-3069 (6th Cir., Aug. 17, 1981); United States v.
Boyd, 620 F.2d 129 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 855 (1980); United States v. Scott, 578 F.2d
1186 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978); United States v. O'Neal, 496 F.2d 368 (6th Cir.
1974). In Scott, the trial court gave an instruction relating identity to the reasonable doubt stan-
dard, see supra note 76, but refused to give a Telfaire-type instruction. The court interpreted
Telfaire, and decisions in other circuits, to stand for the rule that "the model instruction need be
given only when the issue of identity is crucial, i.e., either where no corroboration of the testimony
exists, or where the witness' memory has faded by the time of trial, or where there was a limited
opportunity for observation." 578 F.2d at 1191. Because none of these elements was present in
Scott, the trial court's refusal did not deprive the defendant of his "right to a fair trial." Id
110. The Ninth Circuit has been the least receptive to mandating the use of cautionary jury
instructions on identification as a safeguard against the risks of misidentification. See, e.g., United
States v. Trejo, 501 F.2d 138, 140 (9th Cir. 1974) ("Moreover, even if requested, the trial court
would have acted properly in refusing to give such an instruction."). See also United States v.
Collins, 559 F.2d 561, 566 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 907 (1977). In all of the cases that have
come before the Ninth Circuit, however, there has either been corroborating evidence, see, e.g.,
United States v. Sambrano, 505 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Trejo, 501 F.2d 138 (9th
Cir. 1974), or the trial court had given some kind of abbreviated cautionary identification instruc-
tion, see, e.g., United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Cassassa, 588
F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied. 441 U.S. 909 (1979), or both, see, e.g., United States v.
Thompson, 559 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977); United States v. Collins, 559
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cuits, like the District of Columbia Circuit,'t 2 however, have never held
that the failure of a trial court to give such instructions-either sua
sponte" 13 or in denying a defendant's request' 1'4 -is a ground for rever-
sal. 1 15 Moreover, only the Third Circuit has followed the Teffaire court
by prospectively mandating the use of model instructions."I6 Gener-
ally, these circuits hold that giving instructions on identification testi-
mony lies within the discretion of the trial judge' 17 and that justice is
F.2d 561 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 907 (1977); United States v. Masterson, 529 F.2d 30 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 908 (1976).
In United States v. Smith, 563 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1021 (1978), the
court was faced with a conviction based upon one eyewitness' identification, with little or no
corroboration. The defendant did not request a cautionary identification instruction at trial and
did not argue on appeal that one should have been given sua sponte. The defendant, however, did
request, and the trial court refused to give, the following instruction: "Henry Albert Smith con-
tends that the eyewitness to the crime had insufficient opportunity to observe the robber, and that
her identification of him as the robber is not correct." Id at 1363-64. Smith held that this was not
an instruction; rather, it was an argument and was properly refused. Id at 1364.
111. See, e.g., United States v. Cueto, 628 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 1980) (no error to refuse
Teffaire-type instructions where there is corroboration and two eyewitnesses). See also United
States v. Ingram, 600 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1979) (no error for trial court to refuse instruction on
interracial identification).
112. See supra notes 83-104 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 73-76 and accompa-
nying text.
113. See, e.g., United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936
(1976); United States v. Trejo, 501 F.2d 138, 140 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. O'Neal, 496 F.2d
368, 373 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Wilford, 493 F.2d 730, 735 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 851 (1974); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1973). For a definition of
sua sponte, see supra note 88. See also infra note 115.
114. See, e.g., United States v. Cueto, 628 F.2d 1273, 1276 (10th Cir. 1980); United States V.
Montelbano, 605 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Cassassa, 588 F.2d 282, 285 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 909 (1979); United States v. Scott, 578 F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978); United States v. Kavanagh, 572 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1978); United
States v. Thompson, 559 F.2d 552, 553 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977); United States
v. Collins, 559 F.2d 561, 572 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 907 (1977); United States v. Master-
son, 529 F.2d 30, 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 908 (1976); United States v. Sambrano, 505
F.2d 284, 287 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Evans, 484 F.2d 1178, 1187 (2d Cir. 1973).
115. A well-accepted rule mandates that a conviction will not be reversed for the failure of the
trial court to instruct the jury sua sponte, unless this omission amounts to "clear error affecting the
substantial rights of the defendant." United States v. Trejo, 501 F.2d 138, 140 (9th Cir. 1974). ,See,
e.g., United States v. Revels, 575 F.2d 74,76 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Roundtree, 527 F.2d
16, 19 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 923 (1976); United States v. Wilford, 493 F.2d 730, 734
(3d Cir.), cert. denied 419 U.S. 851 (1974); United States v. Evans, 484 F.2d 1178, 1188 (2d Cir.
1973). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). See generally Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries:
Problems and Remedies, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 731, 748-51 (1981).
116. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
117. See, ag., United States v. Cueto, 628 F.2d 1273, 1276 (10th Cir. 1980); United States V.
Field, 625 F.2d 862, 872 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Cassassa, 588 F.2d 282, 285 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441, U.S. 909 (1979); United States v. Collins, 559 F.2d 561, 566 (9th Cir.), cert.
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served so long as the jury's attention is focused on the issue of iden-
tity."1* Significantly, of all the cases decided in these circuits, none in-
volved a conviction based on the one-witness rule.119
The Fourth, 120 Seventh 2 ' and Eighth'22 Circuits, in contrast, have
denied, 434 U.S. 907 (1977); United States v. Masterson, 529 F.2d 30, 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 908 (1976); United States v. Sambrano, 505 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Trejo, 501 F.2d 138, 140 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir.
1973); United States v. Evans, 484 F.2d 1178, 1188 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Barber, 442
F.2d 517, 528 (3d Cir. 1971).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Sambrano, 505 F.2d 284, 287 (9th Cir. 1974) ("The court's
instructions. . . were fully adequate and made sure that the jury's attention was focused on the
issue of the defendant's identity.") Closing arguments and cross-examination can achieve this
focus, see, e.g., United States v. Kavanagh, 572 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Dodge,
538 F.2d 770, 789 (8th Cir. 1976) (Webster, J., concurring), cert. denied sub nom. Escamilla v.
United States, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977); United States v. Roundtree, 527 F.2d 16, 19 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied 424 U.S. 923 (1976); United States v. Zeiler, 470 F.2d 717, 720 (3d Cir. 1972), as well
as general jury instructions on the Government's burden of proof and assessing the credibility of
witnesses, see, e.g., United States v. Montelbano, 605 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Scott, 578 F.2d 1186, 1190-91 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 439 U.S. 870 (1978); United States v. Kava-
nagh, 572 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Thompson, 559 F.2d 552, 553 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977); United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 936 (1976); United States v. Sambrano, 505 F.2d 284, 287 (9th Cir. 1974). But see United
States v. Wilford, 493 F.2d 730, 739 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J., dissenting) ("the general instructions
given here were not as likely to focus the jury's attention on the identification issue as those in
Telfaire"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 851 (1974).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Masterson, 529 F.2d 30 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 908
(1976). In Masterson, the court distinguished United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir.
1972), see supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text, and United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273
(4th Cir. 1974), see infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text, as cases in which "a single eyewit-
ness was the only incriminating evidence against the defendant." 529 F.2d at 32. See also United
States v. Montelbano, 605 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1979) ("the conviction here did not rest alone on
eyewitness identification testimony"); United States v. Scott, 578 F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir.) ("[fin
the present case, however, the identification ... was not uncorroborated"), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
870 (1978); United States v. Kavanagh, 572 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1978) ("the government's case
against this defendant did not hinge on possibly mistaken identification testimony alone"); United
States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 997 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[tlhe identifications were only part of the
case"), ceri. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978).
120. Prior to United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1974), see infra notes 123-24 and
accompanying text, the use of identification instructions in the Fourth Circuit was governed by
United States v. Levi, 405 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1968), which merely required the trial court to give
an instruction relating the issue of identity to the reasonable doubt standard. 405 F.2d at 382-83.
121. See, e.g., United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 1975). See also infra notes
125-26 and accompanying text.
122. The Eighth Circuit has considered the issue several times. In United States v. Roundtree,
527 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 424 U.S. 923 (1976), the court held that the trial court's
failure to give Teifaire-type instructions sua sponte was not reversible error, even though the only
evidence against the defendant was the eyewitness identification by one undercover agent. Al-
though it approved of the Telfaire instructions, their omission was not plain error because the
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taken the problems inherent in eyewitness identification testimony and
the solution of special cautionary instructions more seriously. In
United States v. Holley,123 the Fourth Circuit reversed a bank robbery
conviction because of the inadequacy of the trial court's instructions on
identification, and prospectively mandated the use of Te/faire-type in-
structions.12 4 Similarly, in United States v. Hodges,t"5 the Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed a conviction for possession of a stolen check because the
trial court had refused to give the jury the defendant's requested in-
defense counsel's cross-examination and closing arguments, as well as the court's general instruc-
tions to the jury, "sufficiently alerted the jury of the fact that they should carefully and critically
evaluate the strength of the eyewitness testimony." Id at 19. See also United States v. Chrysler,
533 F.2d 1055, 1057 (8th Cir. 1976).
In United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1976), cer. denied sub nom. Escamilla v.
United States, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977), the court upheld the defendant's conviction, which rested
upon uncorroborated identification testimony by a single eyewitness, even though the trial court
refused to give defendant's proposed identification instructions (patterned after the Barber in-
structions, see supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text). The trial court had instructed that the
prosecution had to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt and that the jury should study care-
fully the witnesses' credibility and ability to observe. 538 F.2d at 783-84. The Dodge court dist-
inguished Holley, see infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text, as involving a highly suspect
identification, and Hodges, see infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text, as involving the trial
court's complete failure to specifically instruct on identification. 538 F.2d at 784. There was no
reversible error inDodge because the identification was reliable and the trial court did instruct on
identity, but the court warned: "we will view with grave concern the failure to give specific and
detailed instructions on identification in future cases where identification of the defendant is based
solely or substantially on eyewitness testimony." Id See also Durns v. United States, 562 F.2d
542, 550 (8th Cir.) (no error to delete first and last paragraphs of Telfaire instructions when there
is substantial circumstantial evidence in addition to eyewitness testimony), cert denied, 434 U.S.
959 (1977); Osborne v. United States, 542 F.2d 1015, 1019 (8th Cir. 1976) (no error in refusing a
"superfluous" instruction where identification was by two eyewitnesses and there was substantial
corroborative evidence). The Eighth Circuit acted on its Dodge warning in United States v.
Greene, 591 F.2d 471, 477 (8th Cir. 1979). See infza notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
123. 502 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1974).
124. The Government's entire case in Halley was the uncorroborated identification testimony
of a single eyewitness which was "so lacking in positiveness as to strongly suggest the 'likelihood
of irreparable misidentification."' Id at 276. The trial court had instructed in accordance with
United States v. Levi, 405 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1968). See supra note 120. This instruction was
inadequate because it failed to "specifically" instruct the jury "to consider the possibility of mis-
identification." 502 F.2d at 276. The court expressly mandated the use of Tel/aire instructions, Id
at 277, with the qualification that they need not be given verbatim, because "[d]ifferent factual
situations. . . call for different degrees of particularity." Id But see United States v. Revels, 575
F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1978) (failure of trial court to give Telfaire instructions sua sponte not plain error
where identification appeared reliable and there was corroborating evidence); United States v.
Johnson, 495 F.2d 377 (4th Cir. 1974) (failure of trial court to give Telfaire instructions not revers-
ible error where there were "circumstances greatly reducing the possibility of misidentification").
125. 515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1975).
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structions on eyewitness identifications. 26 Finally, in United States v.
Greene, 27 the Eighth Circuit reversed a conviction for perjury where
the trial court had refused to give Telfaire-type instructions. 28 Hodges
is presently the most liberal decision of the federal courts because the
conviction was based on identification testimony by three eyewitnesses
and corroboration testimony by the arresting officer.' 29  Both Holley
and Greene, in contrast, involved convictions based on the one-witness
rule. 30
Although the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits
have never reversed a conviction on the ground of the inadequacy of
identification instructions, 13 these circuits might be compelled to fol-
126. In Hodges, the Seventh Circuit viewed the refusal as error because the most important
issue in the trial was identification. The court argued that cross-examination, closing arguments,
and general instructions on burden of proof and credibility of witnesses were insufficient safe-
guards against the "dangers of misidentification which are inherent in eyewitness testimony." Id
at 653. The court therefore reversed and mandated the giving of Tefaire-type instructions when-
ever identification is the primary issue and the instructions are requested by counsel. Id As
indicated by United States v. Kimbrough, 528 F.2d 1242, 1248 (7th Cir. 1976), however, Teifaire
instructions need not be given verbatim and minor deletions and variations are permissible. See
infra note 129.
127. 591 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1979). Greene relied on the Eighth Circuit's earlier decision in
United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Escamilla v. United
States, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977), see supra note 122. 591 F.2d at 475-77. Interestingly, the Greene
court distinguished Dodge because it was not a case in which "the eyewitness identification [was]
the sole basis for the conviction." Id at 477. Because the one-witness rule was applied in Greene,
the court apparently felt that this distinction was sufficient reason to affirm in Dodge, while revers-
ing in Greene. The distinction is erroneous, however, because the Dodge court stated that there
was only one witness identifying the defendant, and even found it necessary to discuss the one-
witness rule. 538 F.2d at 783.
128. The court argued that because the Government's case rested solely on the doubtful iden-
tification by a single eyewitness, the trial court's refusal was error. The instructions given were
inadequate because they "never called the jury's attention to the fact that there was a crucial
eyewitness identification involved or elaborated as to any of the dangers of misidentification' 591
F.2d at 476-77.
129. 515 F.2d at 652. In United States v. Cowsen, 530 F.2d 734 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 422
U.S, 906 (1976), however, the Seventh Circuit seemed to retreat from its liberal position in
Hodges. In Cowsen, the trial court, two weeks after Hodges was decided, refused to instruct the
jury that identification was in issue or that the reasonable doubt standard applied to that issue. Id
at 738. The evidence against the defendant was the identification testimony of two undercover
agents. Defendant's conviction for distributing heroin was affirmed. The appellate court reasoned
that Hodges required Telfaire instructions be given upon request, and that because the instructions
requested were not Telfaire instructions, it was not error to refuse them. In contrast to Hodges, see
supra note 126, the Cowsen court attached significant weight to the effectiveness of the closing
arguments of counsel and the general instructions on credibility of witnesses. 530 F.2d at 739.
130. See supra notes 124 & 128.
131. See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
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low the example of the Fourth and Eighth Circuits given an analogous
factual situation.' 32 These circuits are not likely to go as far as the Sev-
enth Circuit in Hodges, however, because of their extreme reluctance to
reverse convictions for failure of the trial judge to give identification
instructions. 33 In sum, most circuits would affirm a conviction based
on eyewitness identification testimony, even absent Telfaire-type in-
structions, if the court could find sufficient indicia of reliability.' 34
. Telfaire-Type Instructions in the State Courts
Mandatory Tefaire-type instructions have met with only limited suc-
cess in state courts as well. One reason is that in most states trial judges
are prohibited from commenting on evidence in their instructions to
juries. 35  Several state courts that have confronted the issue have spe-
cifically held that Telfaire-type instructions violate the prohibition
against judicial comment on evidence. 136  Other states have held
Tefaire-type instructions objectionable for their lack of simplicity, im-
partiality, and brevity. 37 Thus, several jurisdictions expressly disallow
special cautionary instructions on eyewitness identification testimony.
Moreover, many states that do not formally object to Teyfaire-type
instructions have held that a trial court does not commit error or abuse
its discretion by refusing to give such instructions either at a defend-
ant's request' 38 or sua sponte.' 39 This is true even when a case pro-
132. Such a factual situation might be a case where the one-witness rule applies. See supra
note 119 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 101-18 and accompanying text.
134. These indicia include appearances of reliability as well as corroboration or circumstantial
evidence. See supra note 124.
135. H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JuRY 420, table 104 (1966). Thirty.nine
states have such prohibitions. Id The federal courts and the following eleven states allow judicial
comment on evidence: California, Connecticut, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont and Wisconsin. Id See generally infra notes
248-69 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., State v. Valencia, 118 Ariz. 136, 575 P.2d 335 (1977); Conley v. State, 270 Ark.
886, 607 S.W.2d 328 (1980); State v. Ollison, 16 Or. App. 544, 519 P.2d 393 (1974); State v. Robin-
son, 274 S.C. 198, 262 S.E.2d 729 (1980); State v. Jordan, 17 Wash. App. 542, 564 P.2d 340 (1977).
137. See, eg., People v. Robinson, 75 I11. App. 3d 112, 394 N.E.2d 13 (1979); People v. Bur-
nett, 74 Ill. App. 3d 990, 394 N.E.2d 456 (1979); State v. Higgins, 592 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. en banc
1979), appeal dismissed, 446 U.S. 902 (1980); State v. White, 617 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981);
State v. Sloan, 575 S.W.2d 836 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
138. See, e.g., Vincent v. State, 399 So. 2d 923 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981); Shields v. State, 397 So.
2d 184 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 397 So. 2d 189 (1981); People v. Hurley, 95 Cal. App. 3d
895, 157 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1979); People v. Reynolds, 38 Colo. App. 258, 559 P.2d 714 (1976); State
v. Harden, 175 Conn. 315, 398 A.2d 1169 (1978); Wilkerson v. United States, 427 A.2d 923 (D.C.
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ceeds to the jury under the one-witness rule. 140 The justification
behind these decisions is that a defendant is adequately protected
against misidentification if the jury's attention is focused on the issue of
identity141 and if the identification is apparently reliable."12
Several state courts have observed that cross-examination of eyewit-
nesses and closing arguments,"43 as well as general instructions on the
prosecution's burden of proof and the assessment of witnesses' credibil-
1975), ceri. denied, 454 U.S. 852 (1981); Nelson v. State, 362 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978);
Sapp v. State, 155 Ga. App. 485, 271 S.E.2d 19 (1980); State v. Padilla, 57 Hawaii 150, 552 P.2d
357 (1976); Brock v. Commonwealth, 627 S.W.2d 42 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
2302 (1982); State v. Monroe, 397 So. 2d 1258 (La. 1981); Sparks v. State, 96 Nev. 26, 604 P.2d 802
(1980); State v. Burke, - N.H. _ 448 A.2d 962 (1982); State v. Mazurek, 88 N.M. 56, 537 P.2d 51
(Ct. App. 1975); State v. Guster, 66 Oh. St. 2d 266, 421 N.E.2d 157 (1981); State v. Christian, 35
Or. App. 339, 581 P.2d 132 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 845 (1979); State v. Classen, 31 Or. App.
683, 571 P.2d 527 (1977); State v. Robinson, 274 S.C. 198, 262 S.E.2d 729 (1980); State v. Jones,
273 S.C. 723, 259 S.E.2d 120 (1979); State v. Motes, 264 S.C. 317, 215 S.E.2d 190 (1975); State v.
Lewis, 628 S.W.2d 750 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981); Holt v. State, 591 S.W.2d 785 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1979); State v. Kasper, 137 Vt. 184, 404 A.2d 85 (1979); State v. Jordan, 17 Wash. App. 542, 564
P.2d 340 (1977); Hampton v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 450, 285 N.W.2d 868 (1979).
139. See, eg., State v. Benjamin, 33 Conn. Supp. 586, 363 A.2d 762 (Super. Ct. 1976); Smith v.
United States, 343 A.2d 40 (D.C. 1975); State v. Thomas, 541 S.W.2d 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976);
Commonwealth v. Moffett, - Mass. _ 418 N.E.2d 585 (1981); State v. Lang, 46 N.C. App. 138,
264 S.E.2d 821 (1980); State v. Stinson, 88 S.D. 592, 226 N.W.2d 155 (1975). State v. Malmrose,
649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982).
140. See, eg., Smith v. United States, 343 A.2d 40 (D.C. 1975); Nelson v. State, 362 So. 2d
1017 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); State v. McFarland, 604 S.W.2d 613 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); State v.
Thomas, 541 S.W.2d 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); State v. Todd, 537 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976);
State v. Guster, 66 Ohio St. 2d 266, 421 N.E.2d 157 (1981); State v. Johnson, 12 Wash. App. 40,
527 P.2d 1324 (1974). Cf. State v. Schaffer, 638 P.2d 1185 (Utah 1981) (although sole evidence
was identifications by two eyewitnesses, it was not error to refuse to give Tefaire-type instruction
to jury).
141. See, e.g., State v. Benjamin, 33 Conn. Supp. 586, 363 A.2d 762 (Super. Ct. 1976); State v.
Lang, 46 N.C. App. 138, 264 S.E.2d 821 (1980); State v. Christian, 35 Or. App. 339, 581 P.2d 132
(1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 845 (1979); State v. Motes, 264 S.C. 317, 215 S.E.2d 190 (1975).
142. See, e.g., Shields v. State, 397 So. 2d 184 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981); State v. Harden, 175
Conn. 315, 398 A.2d 1169 (1978); State v. Benjamin, 33 Conn. Supp. 586, 363 A.2d 762 (Super. Ct.
1976); Wilkerson v. United States, 427 A.2d 923 (D.C.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 852 (1981); State v.
PadiUla, 57 Hawaii 150, 552 P.2d 357 (1976); Brock v. Commonwealth, 627 S.W.2d 42 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2302 (1982); State v. Lang, 46 N.C. App. 138, 264 S.E.2d 821
(1980); State v. Guster, 66 Ohio St. 2d 266, 421 N.E.2d 157 (1981); State v. Motes, 264 S.C. 317,
215 S.E.2d 190 (1975).
143. See, e.g., Conley v. State, 270 Ark. 886, 607 S.W.2d 328 (1980); Smith v. United States,
343 A.2d 40 (D.C. 1975); State v. Padilla, 57 Hawaii 150, 552 P.2d 357 (1976); People v. Benson,
71 11. App. 3d 591, 390 N.E.2d 113 (1979); People v. Hefner, 70 Ill. App. 3d 693, 388 N.E.2d 1059
(1979); State v. Higgins, 592 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. 1979); State v. Thomas, 541 S.W.2d 775 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1976); State v. Burke, - N.H. _, 448 A.2d 962 (1982); State v. Ollison, 16 Or. App. 544, 519
P.2d 393 (1974); State v. Kasper, 137 Vt. 184,404 A.2d 85 (1979); State v. Edwards, 23 Wash. App.
893, 600 P.2d 566 (1979).
Washington University Open Scholarship
1416 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 60:1387
ity,'4 can achieve this focus. Other courts have held that it can be
achieved only through jury instructions stating that identity is in issue
and that the prosecution bears the burden of proof on that issue.14 5
These states, however, fail to address the inherent unreliability of eye-
witness identifications or the factors affecting the reliability of such
evidence. 146
144. See, e.g., State v. Valencia, 118 Ariz. 136, 575 P.2d 335 (Ct. App. 1977); Conley v. State,
270 Ark. 886, 607 S.W.2d 328 (1980); People v. Hurley, 95 Cal. App. 3d 895, 157 Cal. Rptr. 364
(1979); People v. Reynolds, 38 Colo. App. 258, 559 P.2d 714 (1976); Nelson v. State, 362 So. 2d
1017 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Padilla, 57 Hawaii 150, 552 P.2d 357 (1976); State v.
Thomas, 541 S.W.2d 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Sparks v. State, 96 Nev. 26, 604 P.2d 802 (1980);
State v. Ollison, 16 Or. App. 544, 519 P.2d 393 (1974); State v. Jones, 273 S.C. 723, 259 S.E.2d 120
(1979); State v. Lewis, 628 S.W.2d 750 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981); State v. Schaffer, 638 P.2d 1185
(Utah 1981); State v. Kasper, 137 Vt. 184, 404 A.2d 85 (1979); State v. Edwards, 23 Wash. App.
893, 600 P.2d 566 (1979).
145. See, e.g., People v. Guzman, 47 Cal. App. 3d 380, 121 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1975); People v.
Smith, 67 Cal. App. 3d 45, 136 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1977); State v. Harden, 175 Conn. 315, 398 A.2d
1169 (1978); Freeman v. State, 371 So. 2d 114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Green, 86 N.J.
281, 430 A.2d 914 (1981); State v. Guster, 66 Ohio St. 2d 266, 421 N.E.2d 157 (1981); Holt v. State,
591 S.W.2d 785 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979); Hampton v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 450, 285 N.W.2d 868
(1979). But see, e.g., People v. Benson, 71111. App. 3d 591, 390 N.E.2d 113 (1979); State v. Lang,
46 N.C. App. 138, 264 S.E.2d 821 (1980).
In Freeman v. State, 371 So. 2d 114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), a Florida court reversed a
conviction for robbery where the only evidence against the defendant was a single eyewitness'
identification testimony and where the trial judge had failed to instruct the jury "as to the exist-
ence of the issue and the burden of proof of the state to prove the issue." Id at 118. The Freeman
court explained that reversal was necessary because the "issue of identification is paramount" and
because "neither summation of counsel at the close of the evidence ... nor cross-examination as
to the matter of identification by defense counsel adequately protects a defendant against the
dangers of misidentification which are inherent in eyewitness testimony." Id at 117. The Free.
man court held, however, that a defendant was not entitled to more than an instruction connecting
identity to reasonable doubt and disapproved of Telfaire instructions. Id at 118.
A California lower court adopted a similar position in People v. Guzman, 47 Cal. App. 3d 380,
121 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1975), where the trial court had refused to give an instruction "relating identifi-
cation to reasonable doubt." Id at 387, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 73. In reversing, the Guzman court held
that this alone was not reversible error, but "when coupled with other errors. . . may have con-
tributed to defendant's prejudice." Id Other California appellate courts, however, probably
would not have found any error in the trial court's refusal to give the instruction requested in
Guzman. See, e.g., People v. Hurley, 95 Cal. App. 3d 895, 157 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1979).
In State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 430 A.2d 914 (1981), the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed a
conviction for rape where the trial court's instructions to the jury had failed to emphasize that the
issue of identity had to be resolved against defendant, beyond a reasonable doubt, before the jury
could convict. Id at 293, 430 A.2d at 920. The court also set forth a model instruction for use in
the future. Id
For a discussion of the distinction between Telfaire instructions and identity/reasonable doubt
instructions, see State v. Guster, 66 Ohio St. 2d 266, 272-73, 421 N.E.2d 157, 160 (1981). See also
infra note 165 and accompanying text.
146. This is because the inherent unreliability of eyewitness identification is either "within the
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Only a handful of states have held that it is error for a trial court to
refuse to give Teffaire -type instructions. 47 In State v. Payne,148 for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed a stat-
utory rape conviction that was based on the one-witness rule, holding
the trial court in error for refusing to instruct the jury to scrutinize the
eyewitness testimony carefully. 149  The Payne court approved of
Telfaire instructions in one-eyewitness cases, but refused to set forth a
mandatory rule.' 0 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
reached similar results in Commonwealth v. Rodriguez 5 I and Common-
wealth v. Bowden.'5 2
ordinary experience ofjurors," Nelson v. State, 362 So. 2d 1017, 1021 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978),
or "more properly tested by examination and cross-examination, and any weaknesses in eyewit-
ness identification may be exposed by counsel in argument to the jury." State v. Edwards, 23
Wash. App. 893, 896-97, 600 P.2d 566, 569 (1979). This is contrary to the findings of psycholo-
gists. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
147. These states are Kansas, Massachusetts, New York, and West Virginia. New York has
reversed many convictions for the failure of the trial court to properly instruct the jury on how to
evaluate eyewitness identification testimony. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 82 A.D.2d 840, 439
N.Y.S.2d 661 (1981); People v. Gaines, 80 A.D.2d 561, 435 N.Y.S.2d 346 (1981); People v. Merri-
man, 79 A.D.2d 619, 433 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1980); People v. Bruno, 77 A.D.2d 922, 431 N.Y.S.2d 106
(1980); People v. Rothaar, 75 A.D.2d 652,427 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1980); People v. Best, 73 A.D.2d 651,
422 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1979); People v. Anthony P., 72 A.D.2d 525,420 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1979); People v.
Fludd, 68 A.D.2d 409, 417 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1979); People v. Goins, 64 A.D.2d 905, 407 N.Y.S.2d
891 (1978); People v. Rodriguez, 61 A.D.2d 914, 402 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1978); People v. Byrdsong, 58
A.D.2d 877, 396 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1977). The Supreme Court of New Hampshire recently indicated
that in the future it would "view with grave concern" the failure to give a Telfaire-type instruction
in cases in which "eyewitness identification is essential to support a conviction." State v. Burke,
- N.H. -, 448 A.2d 962, 966 (1982). Cf. State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 62-66 (Utah 1982)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (special eyewitness cautionary instruction should be given sua sponte
where identification is a major issue).
148. 280 S.E.2d 72 (W. Va. 1981).
149. Id at 78. In Payne, the testimony of the eyewitness/victim was uncorroborated and un-
contradicted. Id The court determined that the facts fell "squarely between" those of two prior
cases, State v. Perry, 41 W. Va. 641, 24 S.E. 634 (1896), and State v. Garten, 131 W. Va. 641, 49
S.E.2d 561 (1948). Perry involved uncorroborated and contradicted testimony, whereas Garten
involved corroborated and uncontradicted testimony. 280 S.E.2d at 77. The Perry court held that
the trial court's refusal to instruct that the testimony should be scrutinized "with care and caution"
was in error. Id The Payne court found Perry controlling and therefore reversed. Id at 78.
150. 280 S.E.2d at 78-79.
151. 378 Mass. 296, 391 N.E.2d 889 (1979). In Rdriguez, the trial court's refusal to give de-
fendant's instructions constituted error, because the instructions "failed entirely to mention that
the victim might honestly have been mistaken in her identification of the defendant." Id at 302,
391 N.E.2d at 893. The court set out and approved the use of Telfaire instructions. Id at 310-11,
391 N.E.2d at 897-98. The court reversed, but because there were other errors, it is not apparent
whether the inadequacy of the instructions given was alone sufficient cause for reversal.
152. 379 Mass. 472, 399 N.E.2d 482 (1980). Bowden noted with approval the "substantial
precedent favoring an instruction concerning identification testimony where the issue is fairly
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In State v. Warren, 53 the Kansas Supreme Court strongly supported
the use of Telfaire-type instructions. In Warren, a jury had convicted
the defendant on the identification testimony of a single eyewitness and
the trial court had refused to give the defendant's requested instruc-
tions on the factors affecting the reliability of such testimony.1- 4 The
Warren court reversed the conviction and held that in criminal cases
where eyewitness identification is a crucial component of the prosecu-
tion's case and the identification is arguably unreliable, the trial court
should give a cautionary instruction advising the jury which factors to
consider in determining whether the eyewitness identification testi-
mony is credible. 15  The court argued that, without such an instruc-
tion, 56 the jury might infer from the admission of the testimony that
the trial court warranted its reliability.' 57
raised" and concluded that "the defendant in the case at bar was entitled to such an instruction."
Id at 484, 399 N.E.2d at 490. The court reversed, but, as in Rodriguez, there were other errors
present.
Subsequent decisions in Massachusetts indicate that the Rodriguez rule will not be applied with
complete vigor. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moffett, - Mass. _ 418 N.E.2d 585 (1981) (omis-
sion of portions of Telfaire instructions not plain error); Commonwealth v. Napolitano, 378 Mass.
599, 393 N.E.2d 338 (1979) (trial court instructions held adequate); Commonwealth v. Cole, 13
Mass. App. Ct. 908, 429 N.E.2d 1029 (1982) (not error for trial court to refuse to give Rodriguez-
Tep/aire instruction where identification was not the crucial issue and defendant himself corrobo-
rated the identification testimony of several witnesses); Commonwealth v. Simmons, - Mass.
App. Ct. -, 414 N.E.2d 623 (1981) (instructions given adequately suggested possibility of mis-
taken identification); Commonwealth v. Durant, - Mass. App. Ct. - 412 N.E.2d 1276 (1980)
(refusal to give Teyfaire instructions harmless error); Commonwealth v. Stokes, - Mass. App. Ct.
408 N.E.2d 887 (1980) (failure to give Teyfaire instructions verbatim sua sponte harmless er-
ror); Commonwealth v. Alleyne, - Mass. App. Ct. - 405 N.E.2d 171 (1980) (refusal to give
Telfaire instructions in full not reversible error).
153. 230 Kan. 385, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981).
154. Justice Prager, writing for the majority, thoroughly surveyed the literature discussing the
problems of eyewitness identifications and the available solutions. Id at 390-92, 635 P.2d at 1240-
41. He also noted decisions in Kansas rejecting the need for Telfaire-type instructions, as well as
cases in the federal circuits and in a few states "holding that it is error not to give a cautionary
instruction on eyewitness testimony where the facts of the case require it." Id at 396, 635 P.2d at
1243.
155. Id at 397, 635 P.2d at 1244. The defendant's requested instructions basically covered the
five Biggers factors, see supra note 54 and accompanying text. The court argued that "[ilf [the
Biggers factors] should be considered in determining the admissibility of the testimony, it would
seem even more appropriate to require the jury to consider the same factors in weighing the credl-
bilty of the eyewitness identification testimony." Id at 397, 635 P.2d at 1244 (emphasis in origi-
nal). There was a strong dissent. See id at 400-03, 635 P.2d at 1246-48 (Fromme, J., dissenting).
156. For the text of the instructions defendant requested to be given to the jury, see id at 398-
99, 635 P.2d at 1244-45.
157. Id at 397, 635 P.2d at 1244.
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In Warren the trial court's instructions were held inadequate, not be-
cause they failed to focus on the issue of identification,I s" but rather
because they failed to focus the jury's attention on the dangers of iden-
tification testimony.'5 9 The court concluded that the trial court should
have given the defendant's requested instructions so that the jury could
have intelligently and fairly weighed the eyewitness identification testi-
mony in order to prevent "potential injustice."' 60
Although the Kansas Supreme Court rationalized that it was follow-
ing the more recent decisions,' 6' a survey of the case law indicates that
it actually adopted a more liberal position on the issue. As in the fed-
eral circuits, 62 very few states would reverse a Warren-type conviction
on the issue of identification instructions, and still fewer would require
that Telfaire-type instructions be given. A small minority of states,
however, is strongly in favor of mandating cautionary instructions on
eyewitness identification testimony.163
III. ANALYSIS: SHOULD COURTS REQUIRE SPECIAL CAUTIONARY
INSTRUCTIONS ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
TESTIMONY?
The purpose of this Part is to determine whether appellate courts
should require special cautionary jury instructions on eyewitness iden-
tification testimony to minimize the risks and deficiencies inherent in
such testimony. At the outset it must be emphasized that the instruc-
tions being considered are Tefaire-type instructions,164 rather than in-
structions that merely relate the issue of identity to the prosecution's
burden of proof or that highlight the fact that identity is in issue.' 65
158. See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
159. 230 Kan. at 399, 635 P.2d at 1245.
160. Id at 397, 635 P.2d at 1244. In State v. Bagby, 231 Kan. 176, 642 P.2d 993 (1982),
however, the Supreme Court of Kansas declined to extend the rule stated in Warren. In Bagby,
the defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary, attempted rape, and aggravated sodomy on
the basis of identification testimony by the victim and a witness. The court affirmed defendant's
conviction, stating: "[w]e find no serious question about the reliability of either identification;
therefore no cautionary instruction under Warren was required. We note also that no cautionary
instruction was requested by counsel for appellant at the trial in this case." Id at 180, 642 P.2d at
997.
161. 230 Kan. at 396, 635 P.2d at 1243.
162. See supra notes 105-19 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 147-61 and accompanying text.
164. For the text of the Te/faire instructions, see supra note 94.
165. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. See also supra note 145 and accompanying
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A. Is There a Needfor Telfaire-Type Instructions?
The examination of the case law in Part II revealed that a common
ground for the refusal of appellate courts to mandate special cautionary
instructions on eyewitnesses is the belief that such instructions are un-
necessary. This belief is founded on the argument that general jury
instructions,'66 together with skillful cross-examination and closing ar-
guments of defense counsel, t67 are adequate protections against any in-
herent risks of misidentification. This argument is flawed for several
reasons.
1. General Instructions Are Inadequate
The view that general instructions regarding the prosecution's bur-
den of proof and the assessment of witnesses' credibility are adequate is
a corollary to the belief that focusing the jury's attention on the issue of
identity or the possibility of misidentification shields a defendant
against any prejudicial risk of misidentification. 168 Such a belief fails
to consider the nature of the risks inherent in admitting eyewitness
identification testimony at a criminal trial.
Experimental psychologists have demonstrated that the notion of a
"photographic memory" is a myth 16 9 and that many factors between
text. These latter instructions are inadequate for the same reasons that general jury instructions
are inadequate. See infra notes 168-78 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of Ohio, in
State v. Guster, 66 Ohio St. 2d 266, 421 N.E.2d 157 (1981), perceptively noted the difference
between general instructions or identity/reasonable doubt instructions, and Telfaire instructions:
Obviously, this charge instructs the jury that it must direct its attention to the identity of
the accused as the perpetrator of the crime, and therefore to the evidence offered in proof
thereof, and decide that issue beyond a reasonable doubt before it may find the defend-
ant guilty. This is, however, at some distance from the real objective of the requested
instruction: to direct the jurors' attention not to the issue of identity, as such, but rather
to the potential unreliability of the eyewitness evidence supporting the issue of identity.
Similarly, the court's instruction to the jury as to its role in determining the credibility of
witnesses, while correct and complete as far as it went, did not specifically address the
question of the inherent unreliability of eyewitness testimony.
Id at 270, 421 N.E.2d at 160 (footnote omitted). See also supra notes 158-59 and accompanying
text.
166. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. See also supra note 144 and accompanying
text.
167. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. See also supra note 143 and accompanying
text.
168. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. See also supra note 141 and accompanying
text.
169. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 24-36 and accompanying
text.
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the time of perception-the encounter-and the time of recall-"that's
him"--can contaminate a person's recollection of another human be-
ing.17 0 These findings render suspect the natural tendency of jurors to
give great weight to eyewitness identification testimony-a tendency
that psychologists have shown occurs notwithstanding the presence of
evidence of the unreliability of the testimony.17 1 This tendency can be
explained by the fact that the inherent unreliability of eyewitness iden-
tifications is simply not a matter of common knowledge."7 2 General
jury instructions are inadequate because they fail to suggest to jurors
that their "common-sense assumptions about identifications are incor-
rect"'17 3 or to instruct jurors on what factors influence the reliability of
eyewitness identification testimony.
Associate Justice Hopper, in his dissent in People v. Hurley,17 4 ob-
served that sending a case involving eyewitness identification testimony
to the jury with only general instructions permits the jury to enter de-
liberations "blind and unknowledgeable" of the crucial factors which
could, and should, be revealed to them in special cautionary identifica-
tion instructions.7 5  Even instructions relating the issue of identity to
the prosecution's burden of proof, 76 or admonishing the jury to con-
sider identification testimony carefully,177 do not begin to provide ju-
170. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. See also People v. Hurley, 95 Cal. App. 3d
895, 903, 157 Cal. Rptr. 364,368 (1979) (Hopper, A.J., dissenting). See generally E. LoFrus,supra
note 9, at 171-77; Woocher, supra note 6, at 970.
173. Jonakait, supra note 1, at 528.
174. 95 Cal. App. 3d 895, 157 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1979).
175. Id at 904, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 369 (Hopper, A.J., dissenting). See also State v. Schaffer, 638
P.2d 1185, 1187-89 (Utah 1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting). In Schaffer, Justice Stewart, of the Utah
Supreme Court, argued in dissent that a conviction for aggravated robbery should have been
reversed where the sole evidence of guilt was the identification testimony of two eyewitnesses and
the trial court refused to give defendant's requested Te/faire-type instruction to the jury. Justice
Stewart argued that the general instructions on burden of proof and credibility of witnesses were
inadequate because
[tihe instructions given referred neither to the inherent problems of eyewitness testimony
and the care with which it should be viewed nor defendant's theory that he was not
present .... mhe instructions are nothing more than boilerplate statements concern-
ing burden of proof which do not deal with the problem at all .... The general burden
of proof instruction clearly did not direct the jury's attention to the issue of mistaken
identity.
638 P.2d at 1188-89.
176. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. See also supra note 145 and accompanying
text.
177. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
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rors with the factors essential to assess the reliability of an eyewitness
identification. 7 8
2. Cross-Examination and Closing Arguments Are Inadequate
Cross-examination and closing arguments of counsel also inade-
quately protect criminal defendants from misidentification in cases in
which eyewitness identification testimony is important. Concededly,
counsel may successfully expose and emphasize factors suggesting that
a particular eyewitness' identification is unreliable. 179 Jurors, however,
are aware that the defense attorney, as adversary, is obligated to defend
his client vigorously. For this reason, the jury is likely to discount any
attacks the defense makes on the reliability of an identification as being
motivated by his partisan desire to win. In addition, the generally ac-
knowledged natural inclination of jurors to afford great credence to
eyewitness identifications1 0 also diminishes the effectiveness of cross-
examination and closing arguments in minimizing the risks of misiden-
tification.' 8' Because the trial judge is a neutral officer of the court, a
jury is likely to be more receptive to his nonpartisan instructions which
enumerate the factors that tend to render an eyewitness identification
178. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text. See also supra note 165.
179. Cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 356-57 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (cross-
examination not effective check on unreliability of identification testimony). In Watkins, Justice
Brennan argued that cross-examination was ineffective to purge "inadmissible identification evi-
dence from the jurors' minds." Id at 356. A pretrial hearing out of the jury's presence on the
admissibility of such evidence was therefore necessary in Justice Brennan's view. Justice Brennan
argued that because eyewitness identification testimony has such a great impact on jurors, "the
jury is likely to give the erroneously admitted evidence substantial weight, however skillful the
cross-examination." Id at 357. Accord United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235 (1967) ("even
though cross-examination is a precious safeguard to a fair trial, it cannot be viewed as an absolute
assurance of accuracy and reliability").
180. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
181. Seesupra notes 126 & 145. The Supreme Court recently, in Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S.
341 (1981), placed great emphasis upon the "time-honored procedure of cross.examination as the
device best suited to determine the trustworthiness of testimonial." Id at 349. The Court made
this statement, however, in rejecting the assertion that due process requires a pretrial hearing on
the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence, out of the jury's presence. See generally
supra note 57. In addition, the Court placed equal, if not greater, weight on the importance of the
jury and jury instructions, and it is therefore unlikely that the Supreme Court would consider
cross-examination adequate in the absence of proper jury instructions. See 449 U.S. at 347. The
Court's emphasis on the role of the jury in Watlkins, see id, suggests that the Court may someday
be receptive to the argument that in cases where eyewitness identification testimony is crucial, due





B. Comparison to Other Reforms: Do Telfaire-Type Instructions
Provide The Optimal Alternative?
The comparison between the giving of special cautionary instruc-
tions and other available reforms183 demonstrates that Telfaire-type in-
structions optimally diminish the problems inherent in eyewitness
identification testimony. At the hub of this comparison are often-over-
looked public policy considerations.
There is more involved in this issue than simply implementing the
findings of experimental psychologists. The criminal justice system is
charged with the duty of protecting society from criminals by convict-
ing them, as well as preserving a defendant's right to a fair trial. Any
attempt to protect a defendant from a mistaken eyewitness identifica-
tion should consider the cost that society must shoulder in furnishing
that protection. The optimal goal is to effectively furnish an accused
with the protection desired while minimizing the concomitant cost to
society.
Beyond giving special cautionary jury instructions, the most plausi-
ble reforms are excluding eyewitness identification testimony en-
tirely,"8 4 abolishing the one-witness rule,"8 ' and introducing expert
psychological testimony. 6
Complete exclusion of eyewitness identification testimony, on the
ground that its probative value is outweighed by its inherent unreliabil-
ity and prejudicial impact, has not been seriously advocated by any
modem commentator. 7 This is because in many criminal cases in
which the defendant is obviously guilty the state cannot carry its bur-
den of proof without eyewitness identification testimony.' Hence, the
cost to society of excluding such testimony would be the state's inability
182. In addition, one court has even suggested that, in the absence of special cautionary in-
structions from the bench, the jury may receive the impression that the judge "vouches" for the
reliability of the testimony by admitting it into evidence. State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 397, 635
P.2d 1236, 1244 (1981).
183. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. See also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 62 & 65 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 19-23 and accom-
panying text.
186. See supra notes 63 & 66 and accompanying text.
187. See generally Woocher, supra note 6, at 1000-01.
188. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
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to obtain convictions in cases resting upon eyewitness identifications
with some probative value."8 9
Experimental psychologists do not suggest that all eyewitness identi-
fications are so unreliable that they should be completely inadmissi-
ble.'90 Rather, they argue that jurors cannot accurately assess the
reliability of identifications by eyewitnesses without knowledge of the
factors that affect reliability.' 9 ' Excluding eyewitness identification tes-
timony therefore gives the defendant more protection than is necessary
at a cost to society that is far from acceptable.' 92
Abolition of the one-witness rule, 93 by requiring corroboration or
circumstantial evidence of guilt before sustaining a conviction resting
upon eyewitness identification, has received serious consideration in
Great Britain' 94 and Canada, 95 but not in the United States. 196 As
with complete exclusion of eyewitness identification testimony, adop-
tion of this alternative would prevent perpetrators of those crimes in
which the sole evidence of guilt is a single person's eyewitness identifi-
cation from being brought to justice.' 97 Again, this solution provides
the defendant with more protection than is necessary at too high a cost
to society.' 98
The reform that psychologists' 99 and legal commentators200 have
supported most heavily is the admission of expert psychological testi-
mony on the inherent deficiencies of eyewitness identifications and the
189. See supra note 65.
190. See generally Woocher, supra note 6, at 1001 ("[A] jury can render a proper verdict only
if allowed to hear all the information needed to reach that decision") (emphasis added).
191. Id See also E. LOFTUS, supra note 9, at 188.
192. See E. LOFrUS, supra note 9, at 188 ("Excluding all eyewitness evidence that might be
deemed unreliable would certainly cause some decrease in the number of justified convictions").
193. See generally supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
194. See Woocher, supra note 6, at 1001-02 n.151.
195. See Starkman, supra note 9, at 372-74.
196. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
197. This would be especially true in crimes of rape or robbery, where often the only evidence
of guilt is the victim's eyewitness identification of the offender. See supra note 17 and accompany-
ing text.
198. In addition, commentators have urged that determining what constitutes sufficient cor-
roboration or circumstantial evidence of guilt is so difficult that this solution is impracticable. See
Woocher, supra note 6, at 1002. See also F. INBAU, J. THOMPSON, J. HADDAD, J. ZAGEL & G.
ST4RKMAN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1273 (2d ed. 1980).
199. See, eg., E. LOFTUS, supra note 9, at 191-203.
200. See, e.g., Cunningham & Tyrrell, supra note 9, at 586-88; Woocher, supra note 6, at 1005-
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factors to consider in evaluating the reliability of such identification.20'
Although this possibility has met with limited success, 202 the weight of
authority in the United States and abroad is that admission of expert
psychological testimony for this purpose is, if not improper, at best
within the broad discretion of the trial court.20 3 Opponents of this re-
form argue that it violates the jury's function as factfinder, that it un-
duly discredits eyewitness testimony, and that it results in a "battle of
experts" that will confuse the jury.204 Although a thorough analysis of
these objections is beyond the scope of this Note, it is sufficient to say
that courts recognize the merit behind these objections.20 5
For present purposes, however, the most serious objection is that ex-
pert psychological testimony overemphasizes the unreliability of eye-
witness identifications.206 A recent study by two psychologists at Johns
Hopkins University concluded that expert psychological testimony
"may make an already doubtful jury too skeptical" of an otherwise re-
liable eyewitness, and hence overly reluctant to convict.20 7 The likeli-
201. See general' supra notes 63 & 66 and accompanying text.
202. See State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 395, 635 P.2d 1236, 1243 (1981).
We note that in the case before us, when the expert testimony of Dr. Loftus was profer-
red by the defense, her affidavit stated she had personally been allowed to testify before
judges and juries in more than 34 cases in various states and that another expert, Dr.
Robert Buckhout, had been permitted to testify in more than 20 state trials on the subject
of eyewitness identification testimony and its inherent unreliability.
Id
203. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. See also Saltzburg, A SpecialAspect of Rele-
vance: Countering Negative Inferences Associated With The Absence of Evidence, 66 CALIF. L.
REv. 1011, 1057-59 (1978) (few courts admit expert evidence on unreliability of eyewitnesses).
204. Eyewitness Testimon; supra note 9, at 134.
205. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. See also Saltzburg, supra note 203, at 1059
("rule requiring admission of expert evidence [on eyewitness identification unreliability] would
present new problems that may be more serious than those it attempts to solve").
206. This is the most serious objection, in terms of a cost-benefit analysis, because it implies
that expert testimony on eyewitnesses overcompensates for the jurors naivete about the unreliabil-
ity of eyewitnesses.
207. Eyewitnesses: Jurors' Opinions, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 1, 1982, at 24, col. 4. The article describes
recent studies by Dr. Howard Egerth and Michael McCloskey, professors in the Psychology De-
partment of Johns Hopkins University. The professors "are concerned that a growing trend to-
ward wariness of eyewitness testimony may be going too far" and "their work suggests that courts
should be wary of allowing expert psychological testimony to attack eyewitness accounts." Id
Moreover, "[t]hey argue that while psychologists are qualified to testify about the specific capaci-
ties of witnesses. . . they cannot aid a jury by describing ways in which an eyewitness can be
mistaken in general terms." Id They also assert, according to the article, that "[jiurors may not
hold eyewitness testimony as sacred as most lawyers and judges think. ... Id But see supra
note 18 and accompanying text. This kind of evidence and controversy emanating from the
psychology field itself provides good reasons to doubt that expert psychological testimony is the
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hood of tipping the scale too far in a defendant's favor renders this
alternative less than optimal.
The giving of Telfaire-type instructions to the jury, on the other
hand, suffers from none of the defects of these alternative approaches.
Jurisdictions mandating the use of special cautionary instructions, for
example, could continue to convict in cases in which eyewitness identi-
fication testimony is the only or the most probative evidence of guilt.
Similarly, scientific data pertaining to misidentifications would not
overwhelm or make the jury overly skeptical of eyewitness identifica-
tion testimony. In addition, the Telfare-type instructions would ad-
monish the jury to consider such testimony carefully in light of the
factors that can render an eyewitness identification more or less relia-
ble. Thus, this reform guarantees the defendant adequate protection
against the inherent deficiencies of eyewitness identification testi-
mony-especially if the improvements suggested below are imple-
mented20 -- while simultaneously safeguarding society's interest in
convicting the guilty. It is a reasonable, balanced approach. 9
C. Are Telfaire-Type Instructions Effective?
Most commentators who have considered the issue, while agreeing
that special cautionary instructions represent a movement in the right
direction, nevertheless contend that such instructions fail to provide ad-
equate protection against misidentification. 210  Their criticisms of the
effectiveness of Telfaire-type instructions are two-pronged: the content
of Te faire-type instructions is inadequate, 21I and jury comprehension
of such instructions is inadequate.2 t2
optimal solution to the problems inherent in eyewitness identifications. See also Suarez, 4 Cri-
tique of the Psychiatrists rRole as an Expert Witness, 12 J. FORENSIC SCI. 172 (1967) (suggests that
psychiatrists are too unfamiliar with procedures of law for their research to have any effective,
heuristic value).
208. See infra notes 220 & 242-47 and accompanying text.
209. Moreover, the Kansas Supreme Court observed in State v. Warren that this reform is also
relatively simple: "The giving of such an instruction will take only a couple of minutes in trial
time and will be well worth it, if some future injustices can be avoided." 230 Kan. 385, 397, 635
P.2d 1236, 1244 (1981). See also Saltzburg, supra note 203, at 1059-60.
210. See Woocher, supra note 6, at 1004 ("[a]lthough special cautionary jury instructions...
take a step in the right direction, they probably do not provide much protection against conviction
of the innocent"). See also E. Lor'rus, supra note 9, at 189-90; Cunningham & Tyrrell, supra note
9, at 588; Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 9, at 133-34; Starkman, supra note 9, at 375-77.
211. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.




I. The Content of Telfaire- Type Instructions
The first criticism is that instructions such as those in Teifaire, which
set forth factors that the jury should consider in assessing the reliability
213of eyewitness identification evidence, are inadequate because they
merely get the jury to focus on the identification rather than supply the
jury with "data or information" that would emphasize the inherent un-
reliability of identification testimony and assist the jury in determining
whether a particular witness' identification is reliable.21 4 Most of the
literature criticizing Telfaire-type instructions in this manner advocates
psychological expert testimony on eyewitness identifications as the
most effective solution.21 5
According to one leading commentator, the expert testimony of a
psychologist would consist of a survey of the pertinent psychological
research and a statement of the factors affecting the reliability of eye-
witness identifications.2" 6 The "data or information" that is lacking in
Telfaire-type instructions, as opposed to psychological expert testi-
mony, is the survey of psychological research and experiments on eye-
witness identifications.21 7 In terms of suggesting the factors that jurors
should consider in assessing the reliability of eyewitness identification
testimony, however, Teifaire-type instructions are equivalent, if not su-
perior, to expert psychological testimony. Although the "data or infor-
mation" that an expert psychologist's testimony would provide might
be more effective in persuading the jury to give little or no weight to
eyewitness identification testimony, such is not a desirable or realistic
result in terms of society's interests.21 ' The desired result is that jurors
213. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. See also State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 398-
99, 635 P.2d 1236, 1244-45 (1981) (defendant's requested instructions).
214. Woocher, supra note 6. at 1004. See also E. LoFrus, supra note 9, at 189-90 ("instruc-
tions do not supply the jury with any information that it can use in the task of evaluating the
reliability of any particular eyewitness account") (emphasis added).
215. See, e.g., E. LoF'rus, supra note 9, at 191-203; Cunningham & Tyrrell, supra note 9, at
586-88; Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 9, at 134-38; Woocher, supra note 6, at 1005-30. For a
discussion of psychological research that takes a contrary view, see Eyewitness: Jurors' Opinions,
Nat'l L.J., Feb. 2, 1982, at 24, col. 4.
216. See Woocher, supra note 6, at 1020. For an example of actual expert psychological testi-
mony on eyewitness identifications by Dr. Loftus, see E. LoFrus, supra note 9, at 217-35.
217. One study indicates that presenting this kind of scientific evidence on the reliability of
eyewitnesses may cause jurors to exaggerate the unreliability of such evidence. See Eyewitnesses:
Jurors' Opinions, Nat'l L.., Feb. 2, 1982, at 24, col. 4. See also supra notes 206-07 and accompa-
nying text.
218. See supra notes 183-209 and accompanying text. See also supra note 217.
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will evaluate the probative worth of eyewitness identification testimony
cognizant of the factors that undermine the reliability of such testi-
monly. 219 Te fafre-type instructions achieve this result.
Moreover, improving upon the content of Telfaire-type instructions
can increase their effectiveness. Courts can accomplish this by enumer-
ating more of the factors affecting reliability of eyewitness identifica-
tions and by making the language of the instructions clearer and more
220concise.
2 Jury Comprehension of Telfaire-Type Instructions
The second major criticism of special cautionary jury instructions is
that they will not have sufficient impact to overcome a juror's natural
tendency to give eyewitness identification testimony undue weight.22'
The argument is not only that jurors are inattentive to jury instructions,
but also that they do not hear the instructions until after the eyewitness
testimony has been presented.222  The commentators argue that
Telfare-type instructions cannot therefore effectively ensure that the
identification testimony receives the close scrutiny it deserves. 223
Jurors, like eyewitnesses, have been the subjects of psychological re-
search which has resulted in several movements for jury reform.224
219. See State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981). In Warren, the court stated:
Such an instruction, coupled with vigorous cross-examination and persuasive argument
by defense counsel dealing realistically with the shortcomings and trouble spots of the
identification process, should protect the rights of the defendant and at the same time
enable the courts to avoid the problems involved in the admission of expert testimony on
this subject.
Id at 395, 635 P.2d at 1243.
220. See Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 9, at 110, table 1 (list of factors). See also
Buckhout, Psychology and Eyewitness Identication, 2 L. & PSYCH. REv. 75, 77-88 (1976) (sixteen
sources of unreliability). Perhaps experimental psychologists and draftees of pattern jury instruc-
tions could collaborate to improve upon the current Telfaire instructions. See the Michigan State
Bar Association's recent modification of the Telfaire instructions, reprinted in E. LoFrus, supra
note 9, at 189. Compare Saltzburg's response to the "data or information" criticism of Telfaire-
type instructions: "[Tihis comment focuses on a particular instruction, that required by United
States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972). There is no reason why data could not be
incorporated in jury instructions. Indeed, courts now take judicial notice of 'legislative facts.'
Such facts easily could be conveyed to the jury." Saltzburg, supra note 203, at 1059 n.187 (citation
omitted).
221. See, eg., E. LoFrus, supra note 9, at 189-90; Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 9, at 133-
34; Loftus, supra note 9, at 34; Starkman, supra note 9, at 376-77; Woocher, supra note 6, at 1005.
222. Wooeher, supra note 6, at 1005.
223. Id
224. See, e.g., Strawn & Buchanan, Jury Confusion" 4 Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478
(1976). See generally Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries.- Problems and Remedies, 69 CALIF.
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The research indicates that jurors do not comprehend the law even af-
ter instructions are given,225 that jurors often ignore jury instruc-
tions,226 and that external factors greatly influence jurors' decisions.227
As a criticism of the effectiveness of special cautionary instructions
on identifications, however, these arguments prove too much.228 Trial
by jury is not likely to be abolished.229 Juries are presently accorded
the function of deciding whether an eyewitness identification is accu-
rate and will probably retain that function for some time to come.230
Admittedly, some jurors, even after hearing Telfaire-type instructions,
will not scrutinize eyewitness identification testimony as carefully as
psychologists argue they should. The criminal justice system, however,
is inevitably less ideal than a psychologist's controlled experiment. Er-
rors do, and will, occur.23 1
L. REv. 731, 740-43 (1981); Vinson, Juries: Perception and the Decision-Making Process, 18
TRIAL 52, 52-54 (Mar. 1982); Note, Memory, Magic, and Myth The Timing of Jury Instructions,
59 OR. L. REv. 451,452-61 (1981); Note, Jury Instructions v. Jury Charges, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 555,
556-62 (1980).
225. See Strawn & Buchanan, supra note 224, at 480.
226. Id at 480-81.
227. See Note, Memory, Magic, and Mytk The Timing of Jury Instructions, 59 OR. L. REV.
451, 452-53 (1981). These "extralegal factors" include "physical characteristics of the parties,
emotional display by the defendant, and the juror's own personality traits." Id One commenta-
tor sums up the results of the research on jury performance by stating that "some of our cherished
but simplistic assumptions about our juries may give way before modem communication and
behavioral knowledge." Strawn & Buchanan, supra note 224, at 479. See also Schwarzer, supra
note 224, at 731, 742 ("jury's capacity to serve as the repository of the people's sense ofjustice,
reason, and fair play is being questioned"; "large proportion of jurors do not understand the
instructions they receive and do not follow them").
228. See Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347 (1981) ("where identification evidence is at
issue.. . no. . . special considerations justify a departure from the presumption that juries will
follow instructions").
229. Trial by jury is a cornerstone of the Anglo-American system of criminal justice and is
guaranteed by article III of the Constitution. See Note, Jury Instructions v. Jury Charges, supra
note 224, at 557. See also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See generaly Strawn & Buchanan, supra note
224, at 483; Note, supra note 227, at 472.
230. See Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 (1981). In Watkins, the Court stated: "[Tihe
proper evaluation of evidence under the instructions of the trial judge is the very task our system
must assume juries can perform. Indeed.. . the only duty of a jury in cases in which identifica-
tion evidence has been admitted will often be to assess the reliability of that evidence." Id at 347
(emphasis in original).
231. As Justice Harlan stated in his concurring opinion in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970):
"[I]n a judicial proceeding in which there is a dispute about the facts of some earlier event, the
factfinder cannot acquire unassailably accurate knowledge of what happened. Instead, all the
factfinder can acquire is a belief of what probably happened." Id at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Justice Harlan also stated that "the trier of fact will sometimes, despite his best efforts, be wrong in
his factual conclusions." Id (Harlan, J., concurring).
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That psychologists do not view special cautionary instructions as the
most effective reform is not reason to reject that alternative. A defend-
ant whose guilt is implicated by eyewitness identification testimony is
more effectively protected against any inherent risk of misidentification
if the jury is instructed as to the variables that psychologists have
proven may render such testimony more or less reliable, than if no such
instructions are given.232 In addition, a defendant has the benefit of
whatever effectiveness cross-examination and closing arguments of
counsel can add.233
A comparison of the problems presented by accomplice testimony
and eyewitness identification testimony further illustrates that Te/faire-
type instructions can effectively curb the risk of misidentification. In
most jurisdictions either type of testimony alone provides sufficient evi-
dence to sustain a conviction.234 The danger of accomplice testimony is
that the accomplice may have a motive to give willfully testimony
which is both false and prejudicial to the defendant.235 The risk of
using eyewitness identification testimony is that even the most honest
and conscientious eyewitness can make an erroneous identification due
to the inherent deficiencies of the human memory process. 236 Many ju-
risdictions counteract the dangers of accomplice testimony by mandat-
ing that a defendant, on request, is entitled to an instruction cautioning
the jury to assess accomplice testimony carefully.237 If courts consider
232. Cf. Brigham, supra note 6, at 721 ("[s]ince jurors are apparently unable to distinguish
between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses, any increase in care and attention given to all
evidence would seem to be of benefit to everyone in the system, prosecution and defense alike").
233. See supra note 219.
234. Eyewitness identification testimony: see supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text. Ac-
complice testimony: see, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Toles v. United
States, 308 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836 (1963); United States v. Karavias,
170 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1948); State v. Brewer, 110 Ariz. 12, 514 P.2d 1008 (1973); People v. Wil-
liamns, 19 Ill. 2d 171, 166 N.E.2d 568 (1960); State v. Zwilman, 112 N.J. Super. 6, 270 A.2d 284
(1970). Several states, however, have abolished the one-witness rule for accomplice testimony and
thus require independent corroboration. See, e.g., Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953); State
v. Howard, 97 Ariz. 399, 400 P.2d 332 (1965); People v. MacEwing, 45 Cal. 2d 218, 288 P.2d 257
(1955); State v. Baker, 161 Minn. 1, 200 N.W. 815 (1924).
235. See United States v. Projansky, 465 F.2d 123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1972).
InProjansky, the court recognized that "a human being may color his testimony in the hope that
some Judge may give him recognition for such cooperation," id at 136 n.22, and that "accom-
plices may be motivated to place the responsibilities on others than themselves," id at 139 n.25.
See generally 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 15, at §§ 2056-2062.
236. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
237. See, e.g., United States v. Windom, 510 F.2d 989 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863
(1975); United States v. Leonard, 494 F.2d 955 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Santana, 503
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such an instruction adequate to minimize the dangers of accomplice
testimony,238 then courts should wholeheartedly adopt Tefaire-type in-
structions which do much more than merely direct the jury to evaluate
carefully eyewitness identification testimony2 39 as a means of limiting
the risks of identification testimony.24
In addition, just as Tefaire-type instructions can be improved upon
in terms of their content,24' they can also be improved upon in terms of
their comprehension by the jury. Courts can accomplish this by giving
Teplaire-type instructions before the trial begins, as well as following
the closing arguments.242
Recently, several commentators have advocated pretrial jury instruc-
F.2d 710 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1053 (1974), cert. denied sub nom. Quinones v. United
States, 420 U.S. 963, cert. deniedsub nom Rivera v. United States, 420 U.S. 1006 (1975); United
States v. Owens, 460 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Brown, 454 F.2d 397 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 959 (1972); McMillen v. United States, 386 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1031 (1968); Williamson v. United States, 332 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1964); People v.
Berardi, 332 IlL. 295, 163 N.E. 668 (1928). See generalo F. INBAU, J. THOMPSON, J. HADDAD, J.
ZAGEL & G. STARKMAN, supra note 198, at 1273. An example of an accomplice cautionary in-
struction is as follows:
An accomplice is one who unites with another person is the commission of a crime,
voluntarily and with common intent. An accomplice does not become incompetent as a
witness because of participation in the crime charged. On the contrary, the testimony of
one who asserts by his testimony that he is an accomplice, by the jury, may be received in
evidence and considered by the jury, even though not corroborated by other evidence,
and given such weight as the jury feels it should have. The jury, however, should keep in
mind that such testimony is always to be received with caution and considered with great
care.
(You should never convict a defendant upon the unsupported testimony of an alleged
accomplice, unless you believe that unsupported testimony beyond a reasonable doubt.)
1 E. DEvrTr & C. BLACKMAR, supra note 76, at § 17.06.
238. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
240. This argument that jury instructions can be effective to protect a defendant against possi-
ble misidentification is further supported by analogy to the problem in Watkins v. Sowders, 449
U.S. 341 (1981). In Watkin., the Court held that due process does not require a pretrial hearing
out of the presence of the jury to determine the admissibility of identification evidence because
jury instructions and cross-examination are adequate to protect the defendant against any
prejudice that might occur when the jury hears identification evidence that is later held inadmissi-
ble. Id at 347-49. But see id at 349-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
241. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
242. One commentator has stated that cautionary jury instructions on identifications are an
ineffective solution because "jj]urors do not hear such instructions until the conclusion of the
trial," and by then it is "difficult to counter the impact of the eyewitness testimony." Woocher,
supra note 6, at 1005. Pretrial jury instructions do not suffer from such defects. See infra notes
243-47 and accompanying text.
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tions as a method of jury reform.2 43 They argue that this tool will im-
prove jury performance and comprehension by providing jurors with
"a cohesive structure" within which they can "organize trial events" in
a manner that will enable them to "attend to and better remember rele-
vant facts." 2" For example, if jurors are instructed prior to the trial as
to the pertinent factors for assessing the reliability of eyewitness identi-
fication testimony, then they are more likely to be attentive to the exist-
ence of these factors in a particular eyewitness' identification.24  Thus,
pretrial Telfaire-type instructions tend to dilute the persuasive effect of
eyewitness identification testimony246 by increasing jurors' comprehen-
sion of the instructions.247
D. Are Prohibitions Against Comment on Evidence Insurmountable
Obstacles to the Use of Telfaire-Type Instructions in Some
States?
Thirty-nine states248 prohibit trial judges from commenting on evi-
dence in their instructions to juries.249 Some of these jurisdictions have
held that special cautionary instructions on eyewitness identification
testimony constitute improper comment upon evidence. 50
At common law, a trial judge not only was permitted to comment on
evidence, but also could express his opinion about the facts, so long as
he made it clear to the jury that his opinion was not binding.25 I Abuses
of this privilege, however, prompted many states to prohibit trial judges
from commenting on evidence, thus limiting them to instructing the
jury only on the law. The objective of these prohibitions was to pre-
vent judicial infringement on the jury's role as fact-finder and to give
243. See, e.g., Schwarger, supra note 224; Note, supra note 227; Note, Jury Instructions V. Jury
Charges, supra note 224.
244. Note, supra note 227, at 452. See also Schwarger, supra note 224, at 755-56.
245. Hence, the issue is ensured of receiving more careful consideration. Woocher, sqpra note
6, at 1005.
246. This is true because jurors hear the instructions before the eyewitness identification testi-
mony has had its tremendous impact upon them. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
247. The jurors' comprehension is inevitably increased because they hear the instructions
twice. See Note, Jury Instructions v. Jury Charges, supra note 224, at 574 ("repetition can only
enhance jury comprehension").
248. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
249. Federal courts, on the other hand, do not prohibit comment on evidence in jury instruc-
tions. See 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 658 (1974).
250. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
251. See 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 657 (1974).




fuller protection to a defendant's right to a trial by an impartial jury.253
Because these prohibitions are in derogation of the common law, they
are usually strictly construed.254
The definition of comment on evidence varies from state to state, but
the general rule is that a trial judge may not emphasize particular testi-
255 256mony, comment on the weight to be given to particular evidence,
or instruct the jury how to evaluate the credibility of witnesses.257 In
short, a trial judge may only instruct on the law. 258 Telfaire-type in-
structions violate these prohibitions because they emphasize eyewitness
identification testimony and direct jurors on the manner in which they
should evaluate the credibility of such testimony.259 Arguably, then,
the use of Telfaire-type instructions is not an available alternative in
states that prevent judicial comment on evidence, as some courts have
already held.260
Special cautionary instructions on eyewitness identifications, how-
ever, should not be held objectionable even in these jurisdictions. As
stated above, the rationale offered for prohibiting judicial comment on
evidence is protection of the jury's province as fact-finder.261 While
preclusion of Telfaire-type instructions on the basis that they constitute
improper comment on evidence advances this rationale, it simultane-
ously poses a much more serious danger.262 Allowing a jury to decide
the accuracy of eyewitness identification testimony without the benefit
of knowledge of the factors that affect reliability subjects a defendant to
an intolerable risk of misidentification. 263 This is far worse than the




256. Id § 665.
257. Id § 671.
258. Id § 663.
259. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
260. Id
261. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. This is true because psychologists have
shown that jurors give unwarranted weight to identifications by eyewitnesses, see supra note 18
and accompanying text, and are often unaware of the inherent unreliability or the factors that
affect the reliability of such identifications, see supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text. Yet
courts admit eyewitness identification testimony, see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text,
and may refuse to admit expert psychological testimony on identifications, see supra note 66 and
accompanying text.
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fact-finder possibly resulting from giving Tefaire-type instructions.264
According to the United States Supreme Court,265 a trial judge
should consider the five factors enumerated in Neil v. Biggers266 in de-
ciding whether to admit identification evidence. Paradoxically, how-
ever, jurisdictions prohibiting comment on evidence preclude the jury
from using those same five factors in evaluating the probative value of
identification testimony.267 Thus, the protection that the trial judge af-
fords the defendant by considering the Neil v. Biggers factors is lost
when the jury deliberates in ignorance of these factors or their
significance.268
For these reasons courts should not view Tefaire-type instructions as
repugnant to prohibitions against judicial comment on evidence. If
states reject this conclusion, however, the only means of protecting an
innocent defendant from the consequences of inaccurate eyewitness
testimony is to amend prohibitions against comment to accommodate
special cautionary instructions on eyewitness identifications.269
IV. CONCLUSION: A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
A criminal defendant is not adequately protected against the inher-
ent problems of eyewitness identification testimony absent special cau-
tionary jury instructions.2 70 Telfaire-type instructions can effectively 27'
provide this protection at a minimal cost to society's interests and
needs. For these reasons all jurisdictions in the United States should
mandate the use of such instructions in appropriate cases.272 Jurisdic-
tions that refuse to do so ignore the wealth of evidence suggesting that
264. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
266. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
267. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
269. This alternative may seem radical, but it is warranted by the dangers to be avoided, see
supra note 6 and accompanying text, and the values to be advanced-namely, preventing the
conviction of innocent individuals. See supra note 5 and accompanying text,
270. See supra notes 166-82 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 210-47 and accompanying text.
272. There remains the problem of what constitutes an appropriate case and how such instruc-
tions should be mandated. A court can mandate a rule prospectively, but to ensure enforcement
of the rule it may be necessary to reverse a conviction and remand for a new trial with appropriate
identification instructions to be given at the new trial. The reform proposed in this Note should
therefore be implemented in terms of when the absence of Telfaire-type instructions should be
held as reversible error. Two important distinctions can form the parameters of a workable rule:
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eyewitness identification testimony is inherently unreliable.273 The net
effect of this refusal is inadequate protection to innocent persons mis-
takenly identified and to society when the true offender remains free.2
74
This consequence is contrary to fundamental notions of justice27 and
is intolerable.
Steven E. Holtshouser
whether the case is one in which the one-witness rule applies, and whether the instructions were
requested by defense counsel at trial.
Because cases involving the one-witness rule present special dangers, see supra notes 19-23 and
accompanying text, the absence of Te/faire-type instructions in such cases demands reversal and a
new trial, whether or not defense counsel requested such instructions. In other words, failure to
give Te/faire-type cautionary instructions sua sponte in one-witness rule cases should be reversible
error.
Because cases in which there is corroborating or circumstantial evidence of guilt do not present
as great a danger or misidentification as do cases based upon the one-witness rule, a less stringent
cautionary jury instruction standard should apply. In this situation, a defendant should be enti-
tled to Telfaire-type instructions, if eyewitness identification testimony is important to the state's
case, upon request. It should therefore be reversible error for a trial court to refuse to give such
instructions when requested by the defendant, but not so if the defendant fails to request them.
273. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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